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I.

INTRODUCTION

In this first presidential election year following the enactment
of the most sweeping change in campaign finance reform laws in a
generation—the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)
(better known as the McCain-Feingold Law in honor of its chief
1
Senate sponsors) —tax-exempt organizations have received
unprecedented attention.
Political operatives, regulators,
commentators, and advocates on both sides of the campaign
finance debate have focused intensely on nonprofit organizations.
Those organized under § 527 of the Internal Revenue Code have
been subject to particular scrutiny, and this once obscure provision
1. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat.
81 (codified in scattered new and amended sections of 2 U.S.C. & 36 U.S.C. § 510
(West 2004)).
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has now become a regular feature of newspaper headlines.
The country’s deeply felt political divisions have driven
political combatants on both sides to see victory in the 2004
elections as essential, yet BCRA prevents these eager advocates
from pouring unlimited resources into traditional political party
2
structures. With unlimited giving to political parties now curtailed,
those with political agendas have been experimenting with various
types of tax-exempt structures to create entities that can promote
issues or candidates within the scope of both federal tax and
3
election law. Thus, they have looked to the federal tax code to
determine what other types of organizations may be available to
run advertising and conduct activities on the ground to activate
voters. While 527 organizations have received the most press to
date, various types of 501(c) organizations are also able to carry out
this type of advocacy agenda, and many are actively engaged in
electoral campaigns.
Meanwhile, advocates intent on protecting or reforming the
political system see the stratagems of the ideologues as attempts to
4
exploit “loopholes” in the law and undermine its effectiveness.
Pro-reform advocates are emboldened by back-to-back wins: 1) the
passage of BCRA after many long years of work and debate; and 2)
the Supreme Court’s broad endorsement of the law in McConnell v.

2. 2 U.S.C. § 441i (West 2004).
3. Of course other activities are happening in the context of state and local
elections and may be subject to various state and local election laws.
Organizations exempt from federal income taxation must traverse the equally
tricky intersections between federal tax law and state election laws, not to mention
additional complexities that may be added by state tax laws or other state laws.
Although the information in this article about election-related activities under
federal tax law is equally applicable to these state and local efforts, a full
exploration of the relationship between these laws and any state election law is
beyond the scope of this article. See Rosemary E. Fei, Diane M. Fishburn, &
Barbara K. Rhomberg, The Public Charity’s Guide to the California Initiative Process
(providing an example of a practical guide to compliance with federal tax and one
state’s election laws), at http://www.ncg.org/assets/NCGpubliccharityguide.pdf
(last visited Oct. 3, 2004).
4. Whether use of tax-exempt organizations as vehicles for political advocacy
constitutes a circumvention of campaign finance regulation depends in large part
upon what one considers the purpose of BCRA to have been. Independent
advocacy organizations do not undermine the goal of taking candidates and
officeholders out of the business of raising unlimited amounts of soft money for
political campaigns, a result that the authors consider BCRA has significantly
achieved. If the goal is limiting the ability of citizens to spend money on political
speech, the availability of independent nonprofit organizations to fund and
engage in such speech certainly means that goal has not been attained.
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Federal Election Commission, a ruling notable for the Court’s
willingness to accede to Congressional restrictions on electoral
activity that Congress deemed necessary to protect the political
system from the potentially corruptive influence of money on
politics. Campaign reform advocates are eager to defend these
recent victories, and many seem eager to ride the momentum even
further.
As the 2004 federal election season commenced, the taxexempt organizations being created by the political operatives were
the next likely target for scrutiny. Both reform advocates and
6
actors with a more clearly self-interested, partisan agenda sought
to extend the reach of the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC)
authority to regulate organizations and activities beyond those that
the FEC has historically been able or willing to regulate.
These two powerful forces—political advocates and campaign
reformers—collided in the spring of 2004 in the hearing room of
the FEC, a collision at the crossroads of tax and election law. The
FEC was urged to adopt broad definitions of regulable political
7
8
activity drawn from the tax law. Other commentators urged that
the vagueness of those definitions, vagueness perhaps tolerable for
tax-exempt organizations, was unacceptable as guidance for those
engaged in essential political debate. Faced with a politically
sensitive and enormously complex task, the FEC voted to put off its
rulemaking for ninety days. As this article was headed for
5. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
6. The coalition of strange bedfellows included traditional reform groups
such as the Center for Responsive Politics and partisans such as the Republican
National Committee, both of which had previously been staunch foes of campaign
finance regulation.
See E-mail comments regarding NPRM 2004-6 from
Democracy 21, the Campaign Legal Center, and the Center for Responsive
Politics, to Ms. Mai T. Dinh, Acting Assistant General Counsel, Federal Election
Commission, (April 5, 2004), at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/political_
comm_status/comments.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2004). See also Comments
regarding NPRM 2004-6 from Republican National Committee to Ms. Mai T.
Dinh, Acting Assistant General Counsel, Federal Election Commission, (April 5,
2004), at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/political_comm_status/comments.html
(last visited Oct. 3, 2004).
7. See NPRM 2004-6, supra note †, at 11756–57 (discussing I.R.C. § 100.5,
Alternative 2-A and Alternative 2-B that defined some or all entities organized
under I.R.C. § 527 as “political committees” for purposes of federal election law).
Unless otherwise indicated, all references and citations in this article to the
Internal Revenue Code refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended, currently located at 26 U.S.C.A. (West 2004).
8. The authors’ law firm was one of those commenting. (Indeed, those
comments form the basis for much of this article.)
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publication, the FEC again took up proposals to regulate 527s, but
the only proposal that found the necessary four votes from among
the commissioners did not include sweeping regulation of 527s.
Nonetheless, the regulatory engines may yet roar back to life.
Reform groups have expressed anger at the FEC decision and may
seek restrictions on 527 organizations through other means—
9
perhaps litigation or congressional action.
In light of this vastly increased interest in political advocacy by
tax-exempt organizations, this article will look at the tax law’s
definitions of “political” activity by § 501(c)(3)s, other § 501(c)s,
and § 527s, identifying the many points of congruence and the
occasional important differences. We further attempt to explain
why the FEC’s detour onto the slippery pavement of tax law led to
this crash, and why attempts to follow the tax law’s definitions of
political activity will inevitably lead regulatory efforts astray. The
legal roads of tax and election law begin from different policy
rationales, intersect in seemingly similar concepts, but then
proceed to wildly different legal destinations. We conclude with a
discussion of why, as a matter of constitutional law, laws that suffice
for tax purposes are fatally flawed for election law uses. It is our
hope that this analysis will at least steer proponents of campaign
10
finance reform away from another foreseeable crash.
II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS: A PRIMER ON TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS AND IRS GUIDANCE
We begin with a brief overview of the types of tax-exempt
organizations discussed below, followed by a quick detour to
provide an introduction to the various types of Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) guidance documents upon which the article draws.

9. See Statement by Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21 on FEC
Failure Yesterday to Stop 527 Groups from Illegally Spending Soft Money on
Attack Ads (Aug. 20, 2004), at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/press1278.html; Kenneth P. Doyle, FEC Votes 4-2 to Adopt Limited New Rule Requiring
‘Hard Money’ for Some 527 Groups, BNA MONEY & POL. REP., Aug. 20, 2004.
10. The authors do not oppose, in theory, regulatory attempts to define more
clearly and, perhaps more broadly, the scope of FEC-regulated “political
committees,” the primary focus of the recent rulemaking. See supra Part I. Our
primary concern is the appropriation of tax law concepts for other purposes. The
forces driving the development of tax definitions are not compatible with other
constitutionally permissible regulatory ends.
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A. Tax-Exempt Organizations
The universe of nonprofit organizations consists largely, but
not entirely, of tax-exempt organizations. Nonprofit corporations
or associations, like their for-profit counterparts, are creatures of
state law. Federal tax law separately provides for exemption from
federal income taxation of entities that fall into certain specifically
enumerated categories. By way of introduction for those readers
who do not spend their days immersed in the U.S. Tax Code, the
different types of organizations discussed in this article are briefly
11
outlined below.
The most common type of tax-exempt organization is
organized under Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 501(c)(3). In
12
addition to being exempt from paying income tax themselves,
501(c)(3)s enjoy the additional advantage of receiving tax13
The activities of these
deductible charitable contributions.
organizations must be almost entirely educational, charitable,
14
religious, or scientific.
Thus, these organizations include nonprofit healthcare providers and other human service organizations,
educational institutions, nonpartisan policy research organizations,
churches and other religious institutions, and foundations and
other grant-making organizations. Section 501(c)(3)s that qualify
15
as “public charities” are permitted to lobby to a limited extent; all
501(c)(3)s are strictly prohibited from intervening in campaigns
16
for elected public office.
A 501(c)(4) organization is a “social welfare organization” or
“civic league” that may pursue educational, lobbying, and political

11. This is by no means an exhaustive or authoritative description of these
organizations or the rules that apply to their operations. Readers seeking more
detail should review the IRS Publication, Tax-Exempt Status for Your
Organization. See I.R.S. Pub. 557 (Rev. May 2003). Readers should also review any
of several credible texts on the subject, the most prominent of which is Bruce
Hopkins’ The Law of Tax-Exempt Organizations. BRUCE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (8th ed. 2004) [hereinafter HOPKINS].
12. I.R.C. § 501(a).
13. Id. § 170(a)(1).
14. Id. § 501(c)(3). These organizations may also be engaged in literary
activities, testing for public safety, fostering international amateur sports
competition, or prevention of cruelty to children or animals. Id.
15. See id. (“[N]o substantial . . . activities . . . attempting to influence
legislation”) (emphasis added). See also id. § 501(h) (permitting lobbying by
certain public charities within certain expenditure limits).
16. Id. § 501(c)(3).
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activities. 501(c)(4)s are exempt from most federal taxes, but
19
contributions to a 501(c)(4) organization are not tax-deductible.
A 501(c)(4)’s “primary” activities must be those that benefit the
public, including any activity in which a 501(c)(3) organization
20
may legally engage.
Although not the focus of this article,
501(c)(5) labor organizations and 501(c)(6) business associations
21
are subject to similar restrictions.
Section 527 is the section of the Tax Code for many different
types of political organizations. These political organizations may
be independent organizations, incorporated or not, or they may be
organized merely as a fund established by a 501(c) organization
22
under § 527(f). Section 527 organizations are generally exempt
23
from federal income tax, but do pay tax on investment income.
24
Gifts to 527s are expressly exempted from the estate and gift tax.
Political parties and campaigns are classified for tax purposes
under § 527, as are various types of non-candidate political
committees such as federal and state Political Action Committees
25
(PACs). Section 527 organizations that are not registered with the
26
FEC must register with the IRS. Those that do not disclose their
receipts and expenditures to the FEC or a similar state agency must
27
file periodic reports with the IRS.
Both the registrations and
28
regular reports are publicly available. In recent years, “527” has
17. See id. § 501(c)(4) (defining organization). See also discussion infra Part
IV.B (discussing IRS precedential and nonprecedential guidance regarding
advocacy by § 501(c)(4) organizations).
18. I.R.C. § 501(a).
19. Cf. id. § 170(c) (defining charitable contributions as implicitly excluding
contributions to § 501(c)(4) organizations).
20. See id. § 501(c)(4). See also infra Part IV.A (discussing definition of “social
welfare” activities).
21. I.R.C. § 501(c)(5)–(6); Gen. Couns. Mem. 34, 233 (Dec. 3, 1969)
(reversing prior IRS position that political campaign intervention could be sole
activity of a § 501(c)(6) organization if shown to be germane to its exempt
purpose and concluding that candidate support transcends the narrower exempt
purpose of a business association and cannot be its primary activity).
22. See id. § 527(f).
23. Id. § 527.
24. Id. § 2501(a)(5).
25. Throughout this article, we use “PAC” as a simple way of describing a
political committee subject to the state or federal legal restrictions, such as federal
election law restrictions on the size and source of contributions. Our use of this
term is meant to convey a distinction from so-called “soft” 527s discussed infra Part
V.
26. I.R.C. § 527(i).
27. Id.
28. See Internal Revenue Service, Tax Information for Political Organizations,
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become shorthand for non-party, non-PAC political organizations.
It is generally used to refer to those political organizations that are
required to file publicly available reports of their contributions and
expenditures with the IRS. Although the authors are frustrated
with this somewhat misleading short-hand, we have not been able
to come up with a better substitute, so generally this article uses
“527 organizations” as a term referring to a subset of the entire
universe of 527 political organizations.
B. IRS Materials
Because of a general lack of precedential guidance from either
the IRS or the courts in the area of political activity by exempt
organizations, nonprofit organizations and their advisors have
become accustomed to looking to a variety of sources to glean
29
information about the proper interpretation of the relevant law.
Readers who are not regular practitioners in this area may not be
familiar with the range of materials cited below, so perhaps a brief
orientation to the wonderful world of IRS guidance may prove
30
useful.
In addition to the statutes, regulations, and cases familiar to
legal practitioners, signposts on the road through federal tax law
include an array of administrative materials. These are roughly
divided into those considered “precedential” and those that are
not.
All are generated by various offices within the IRS.
Precedential guidance, for obvious reasons, requires approval by
more senior level officials at the IRS.
These precedential
documents represent authoritative interpretations of the law, in the
sense that the IRS considers itself bound by them and allows
taxpayers to cite and rely on them in proceedings before the
Service. Although they are official agency interpretations due some
deference, they are not necessarily binding on a court. This
at http://www.irs.gov/charities/political/index.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2004).
29. For a small, grassroots, nonprofit organization, the most important
question is not what the law actually is, or what the courts would eventually rule
the law to be, but what interpretation the IRS is likely to apply. Being right on the
law is of little solace when the organization has gone out of operation due to
spending all available resources on protracted litigation. Hence, knowing how tax
administrators understand the rules takes on added importance, and any public
statement that sheds light on this question is of use, even if it is not considered
precedential.
30. Readers interested in a more extensive discussion of the sources of law
governing tax-exempt organizations are referred to HOPKINS, supra note 11.
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category includes Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures, as
well as some Announcements and Notices.
Non-precedential rulings are intended only to resolve a
problem with regard to a specific individual or entity; they do not
enunciate rules of general applicability and other taxpayers are not
entitled to cite them as authority or rely on them as precedent,
31
even in identical factual circumstances. However, politically active
tax-exempt organizations travel a route where legal standards have
32
been stated very broadly and precedential guidance is rare.
Consequently, any hint as to where lines have been drawn (be they
dotted white or double yellow) is welcomed and scrutinized.
Private, non-precedential rulings include Private Letter Rulings,
Technical Advice Memoranda, General Counsel Memoranda, and
33
Field Service Advice.
Finally, the IRS produces an annual internal instruction
manual for its Continuing Professional Education (CPE) program.
Articles published in the CPE text are not binding rulings, even
with regard to a single taxpayer. They do, however, provide a
useful and accessible compilation of relevant law on topics of
interest. On occasion, the text may also indicate the thinking of
IRS experts on unresolved questions, and, at the least, they can
indicate how agents in the field are being directed to understand
and apply legal principles.
III. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY 501(C)(3)S
Restrictions on political activities by 501(c)(3)s are found not
only in the explicit language of the statute and its implementing
34
regulations, but also in an interpretation of another 501(c)(3)
31. I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3).
32. See infra note 39.
33. One possible rationale for the multiplicity of types of non-precedential
documents is the ongoing struggle with the IRS by those in the regulated
community trying to gain some insight into the ways in which the IRS applies the
law. The nonprofit publisher of tax-law materials Tax Analysts (and its founder
Tom Fields) have been diligent in pursuing federal Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests and litigation forcing the IRS to disclose its interpretations of tax
law. Paul Streckfus (another champion of greater IRS disclosure) has suggested in
his EO Tax Journal that to prevent disclosure the IRS changes the name of its
guidance documents every time Tax Analysts wins another FOIA lawsuit. See Paul
Streckfus, Editor’s Notebook, PAUL STRECKFUS’ EO TAX J., Nov. 2000, at 4–5
(discussion of unfortunate IRS penchant for secrecy subtitled “Why is the IRS
Going Underground?”).
34. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1990).
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doctrine—the restriction on use of charitable resources for private
benefit. We consider each restriction in turn.
A. Campaign Intervention Prohibited
501(c)(3) organizations are subject to an absolute prohibition
against political campaigning; they may not “participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition
35
to) any candidate for public office.” (For shorthand throughout,
this prohibited 501(c)(3) activity will be termed “campaign
intervention.”)
The prohibition on 501(c)(3) campaign
intervention has been interpreted broadly. Indeed, it has been
interpreted more broadly than would be permissible for most
government restrictions on speech because 501(c)(3)s receive what
is considered a tax subsidy; not only are they exempt from paying
tax on their own income, but 501(c)(3)s receive tax-deductible
36
donations. A broad reading of “campaign intervention” is needed
37
to avoid giving a taxpayer subsidy to electioneering.
In determining whether a 501(c)(3) activity constitutes
impermissible campaign intervention, the IRS will examine an
38
activity based on all the surrounding “facts and circumstances.”
The test has not been further articulated in statute or regulation,
and the courts and the IRS have issued only a very few rulings, even
fewer of them precedential. The rulings that have been issued do
not offer clear road signs, but rather mere examples of 501(c)(3)

35. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
36. In the same vein, the restrictions on election-related activities by
501(c)(3)s are greater than those on other tax-exempt organizations because the
tax subsidy for 501(c)(3)s is more generous than that provided to other
organizations, which generally do not have tax incentives to offer donors.
37. In truth, this is an after-the-fact justification. As a matter of policy, the
need to avoid taxpayer-funded subsidies of partisan political activity is a reasonable
explanation for the prohibition on 501(c)(3) campaign intervention. The actual
legislative intent behind adoption of the prohibition is murky, to say the least.
(For an extensive discussion of the available evidence to suggest Congressional
motivation, see Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly, Election Year Issues, EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION
PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002 app. I, at 448–51 [hereinafter 2002 ELECTION YEAR
ISSUES CPE], available at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/pub/irs-tege/topici02.pdf.)
Nonetheless, the rationalization has become accepted truth. See infra Part VII.A
for a more complete discussion of the courts’ analysis of the tax subsidy as
justification for restricting 501(c)(3) election-related speech.
38. 2002 ELECTION YEAR ISSUES CPE, supra, note 37 at 339.
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39

behavior that is permissible or impermissible.
At one extreme, activities that clearly support or oppose candidates
for office have been found to be in violation of the ban on
501(c)(3) campaign intervention. In Christian Echoes Ministries, Inc.
v. United States, the court upheld the IRS revocation of the exempt
status of a 501(c)(3) that attacked liberal candidates and endorsed
40
conservatives. In Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, the court upheld the
IRS revocation of the 501(c)(3) status of the Church at Pierce
Creek because the church had run newspaper ads four days before
the 1992 presidential election urging Christians not to vote for
41
then-candidates Bill Clinton and Al Gore. Most non-precedential
guidance from the IRS similarly forbids apparent 501(c)(3)
42
support for or opposition to candidates.
Likewise, rating candidates is prohibited for 501(c)(3)s, even if
done in an objective and non-partisan manner. In Association of the
Bar of the City of New York v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the
court upheld the IRS denial of the Bar’s application for
recognition as a 501(c)(3) organization because the Bar rated
43
candidates for non-partisan judicial elections.
39. The result is that practitioners called upon to advise 501(c)(3) clients on
their election-related activities are like drivers forced to intuit the rules of the road
by observing which drivers the police pull over or what crashes are featured in
Blood on the Highway (or similar horrific films legendary from decades of drivers’
ed. classes). Many practitioners in this area have expressed their frustration with
this state of affairs. See, e.g., Commentary on IRS 1993 Exempt Organization Continuing
Professional Education Technical Instruction Program Article on ‘Election Year Issues,’
prepared by individual members of the Subcommittee on Political and Lobbying
Activities and Organizations of the Committee on Exempt Organizations of the
Section on Taxation, American Bar Association (Feb. 21, 1995), reprinted in 11
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 854 (1995). At least one prominent jurist has criticized IRS
reliance on a subjective “facts and circumstances” test in another context. Judge
Posner, considering IRS use of the “facts and circumstances” standard to evaluate
appropriate structure of payments for fundraising costs for 501(c)(3)s wrote that
“‘facts and circumstances’ . . . is no standard at all, and makes the tax status of
charitable organizations and their donors a matter of the whim of the IRS.”
United Cancer Council v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1179 (7th Cir. 1999).
40. 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 414 U.S. 864 (1973). In
addition to finding that it had intervened in campaigns, the court found that
Christian Echoes had engaged in substantial lobbying activities in violation of its
501(c)(3) status. Id.
41. 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
42. See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-09-007 (Mar. 1, 1996) (501(c)(3) intervened
in election by sending fundraising mailings timed to coincide with an election that
implied that contributions would help candidates sharing the organization’s
ideology).
43. 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989). See also
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On the other hand, charities may engage in nonpartisan voter
registration and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) activity.
Statute and
regulations place substantial limits on 501(c)(3) private foundation
funding for voter registration efforts, but in stating those
restrictions, the statute makes it implicitly clear that 501(c)(3)
44
organizations may conduct voter registration efforts. In an effort
to qualify for foundation funding under these laws, a number of
charities have sought and received IRS approval for their effort
through non-precedential Private Letter Rulings. These rulings
suggest that 501(c)(3)s conducting voter registration or GOTV
must target their efforts based on nonpartisan criteria and must
ensure that the issue-related messages used in these efforts discuss a
broad range of issues and do not promote a particular view on
45
issues dividing the candidates.
Two Revenue Rulings examine the area of 501(c)(3) voter
46
guides and legislative voting records. In 1978, the IRS provided
four hypothetical examples—one “good” and one “bad”—for each
of these two types of educational materials related to candidates
47
and incumbent legislators. For voter guides, the IRS approved of a
501(c)(3) producing a voter guide based on a questionnaire that
asked all the candidates running for a particular office to respond
to questions about their positions on a “wide variety of issues”
selected “solely on the basis of their importance and interest to the
Rev. Rul. 67-71, 1967-1 C.B. 125 (501(c)(3) may not evaluate candidates for
elective school board and support certain candidates); Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-35-003
(April 19, 1996) (501(c)(3) may not support program in which panels of citizens
seek objective information about candidates and the issues and use the
information to rate the candidates).
44. I.R.C. § 4945(f). See also Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-3 (1972) (listing those
activities that may constitute “carrying on voter registration drives” for 501(c)(3)
organizations).
45. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-51-029 (Sept. 19, 1997) (approving 501(c)(3) voter
registration and GOTV program targeting low-income, minority, and young
women and using voter education materials on a “broad range of issues”); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 95-40-044 (July 6, 1995) (approving 501(c)(3) voter registration program
targeting minority women); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-23-050 (Mar. 10, 1992) (approving
501(c)(3) voter registration program targeting homeless people and using
messages related to “poverty, housing, health care and crime”); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8822-080 (Mar. 9, 1988) (approving 501(c)(3) voter registration and GOTV program
targeting communities with low voter participation); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-22-056 (Mar.
4, 1988) (approving 501(c)(3) voter registration program targeting “minorities,
low-income people, recent immigrants, under-educated people, and young
people”).
46. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154; Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
47. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
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48

electorate as a whole.” Neither the questions nor the resulting
voter guide that the hypothetical 501(c)(3) distributed to the
general public demonstrated any “bias or preference with respect
49
to the views of any candidate.” In contrast, a similar voter guide
based on questions that did evince some bias on the issues was
50
deemed impermissible.
For legislative voting records, the IRS approved a record of the
votes of all members of Congress on a “wide variety of subjects” that
did not suggest the organization’s approval or disapproval of the
51
positions taken in those votes. A 501(c)(3) produced this record
52
annually and made it available to the general public. In contrast,
the IRS rejected a voting record that was distributed during an
election campaign and that focused only on a narrow range of
issues that were of interest to the organizational members and
53
others to whom the 501(c)(3) distributed the guide. Although
the guide did not expressly support or oppose any candidate, the
IRS found that “concentrating on a narrow range of issues in the
voter’s guide and widely distributing it among the electorate during
an election campaign” made it impermissible 501(c)(3)
54
participation in an election.
The IRS amplified its position on voting records two years
later, holding that an organization could distribute, to a small
number of interested members and others, a voting record that
focused on select issues of importance to the organization and that
55
compared each vote to the organization’s position on the issue.
The Ruling emphasized that this members-only voting record was
not timed to coincide with any election, that it included all
incumbent legislators without indicating which were running for
reelection, and that its distribution was not targeted to particular
56
legislative districts.
Furthermore, the guide did not express
support for or opposition to any candidate and included a
disclaimer reminding readers not to judge the qualifications of a

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id., Situation 2.
Id.
Id., Situation 3.
Id., Situation 1.
Id.
Id., Situation 4.
Id.
Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178.
Id.
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candidate based only on a few votes.
In contrast, the IRS has been unwilling to let 501(c)(3)s
publish lists of candidates who have signed or refused to sign a
candidate pledge. In 1976, the IRS formally approved a 501(c)(3)’s
distribution to candidates of a code of fair campaign practices that
58
the 501(c)(3) did not ask candidates to endorse. Indeed, the 1976
ruling overturned a Revenue Ruling from 1966 that had permitted
501(c)(3)s to affirmatively seek just such a candidate pledge to
59
support a code of fair campaign practices.
The IRS held that
asking candidates to endorse the code “constitutes intervention in a
political campaign and may result, through the publication or
release of the names of candidates who sign or endorse or who
60
refuse to sign or endorse the code, in influencing voter opinion.”
Candidate debates or forums sponsored by 501(c)(3)
organizations have been the subject of multiple Revenue Rulings.
The most complete exposition of the IRS position came in 1986,
when the IRS held that the following described a forum conducted
61
“in a neutral manner:”
All legally qualified . . . candidates [for a particular
62
elected office] will be invited to participate in the forum.
57. Id.
58. Rev. Rul. 76-456, 1976-2 C.B. 151 (modifying and superseding Rev. Rul.
66-258, 1966-2 C.B. 213 for taxable years beginning after 1976).
59. See id.
60. Gen Couns. Mem. 36,557 (Jan. 19, 1976). The full story of these two
Revenue Rulings, Rev. Rul. 76–456 and Rev. Rul. 66–258, as described in the nonprecedential General Counsel Memorandum (GCM) 36,557, makes the reasons
for this IRS reversal clear. See id. The activities of the same organization were the
motivation for both the 1966 and the 1976 Revenue Rulings. When the 1966
ruling was issued, the organization had assured the IRS that although it would ask
candidates to endorse its code of campaign practices it would not publicize the
results. Id. When the organization nonetheless publicized the pledges, the IRS
General Counsel’s office recommended a new ruling to forbid even solicitation of
candidate pledges because publication (which the Counsel saw as having the
potential to influence an election) was “but a logical extension of the solicitation
process.” Id. The result was Revenue Ruling 76-456, which, in its final form, was
modified from the more restrictive draft proposed in the GCM in that it
affirmatively permitted at least the distribution of such a candidate pledge by a
501(c)(3). See id.; Rev. Rul. 76-456, 1976-2 C.B. 151. The authors, as well as other
practitioners with whom we have discussed the matter, believe that the 1976 ruling
was an over-reaction by the IRS, and that, in spite of the 1976 ruling, a 501(c)(3)
would likely win any dispute with the IRS if the organization asked candidates to
sign a pledge but did not publish the results.
61. Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73.
62. With regard to the necessity of inviting all candidates to participate, the
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The questions will be prepared and presented by a
nonpartisan, independent panel. The topics discussed will
cover a broad range of issues of interest to the public,
notwithstanding that the issues discussed may include
issues of particular importance to the organization’s
members. Each candidate will receive an equal
opportunity to present his or her views on each of the
issues discussed. Finally, the moderator selected by the
organization will not comment on the questions or
otherwise make comments that imply approval or
63
disapproval of any of the candidates.
Several rulings also allow 501(c)(3)s to make certain charitable
resources available to candidates if the resources are made available
to all candidates on an equal basis. The IRS held that 501(c)(3)
universities could support a campus newspaper that featured
student-written editorials favoring particular candidates, and any
political science classes that require students to participate in a
64
political campaign (selected by the student). The IRS has also
held that 501(c)(3)s operating broadcast stations may provide
candidates with free air time on an equal basis in compliance with
65
then-current federal communications law.
These rulings provide examples of how the IRS applies the
“facts and circumstances” test and illuminate key “facts” or
“circumstances,” such as the content and timing of any message,
the intended audience for any message, the organization’s history
of engaging in similar activities, and many other factors. A number
of rulings emphasize the importance of including a “broad range of
issues” in any 501(c)(3) voter education or other election-related
activities and communications. The rationale seems to be that a
selective focus on only one or a few issues creates a greater
possibility that the allegedly non-partisan activity will be
courts have allowed 501(c)(3)s to exclude certain candidates with little practical
chance of winning the election if the charity sets objective qualifications for
participation and applies them to all candidates. See Fulani v. League of Women
Voters, 684 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 882 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1989)
(permitting charity to exclude candidate who failed to meet such a threshold test).
63. Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73 (amplifying Rev. Rul. 66-256, 1966-2 C.B.
210, holding that a 501(c)(3) organization may conduct debates on political
matters).
64. Rev. Rul. 72-513, 1972-2 C.B. 246 (regarding a student run newspaper);
Rev. Rul. 72-512, 1972-2 C.B. 246 (regarding political science courses).
65. Rev. Rul. 74-574, 1974-2 C.B. 160.
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manipulated to promote one candidate over another.
Although existing precedential guidance strictly limits the
election-related activities of 501(c)(3)s, a couple of private rulings
do appear to sanction behavior that most advisors in this field
would counsel against. In a Technical Advice Memorandum
(TAM), the IRS Chief Counsel’s office reluctantly concluded that a
charity had not intervened in the 1984 presidential election, even
though it ran issue ads near the time of the October 1984 debates
between candidates Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale that
would generally be understood “to support or oppose a
66
candidate.”
A more recent example is a TAM issued to the
67
Progress and Freedom Foundation (PFF).
PFF’s activities
included sponsorship of a course taught by Congressman Newt
Gingrich entitled “Renewing American Civilization.” After a
lengthy, careful analysis of extremely complex facts, the IRS
concluded that the organization, a 501(c)(3), had not violated the
68
campaign intervention prohibition. It was clear that individuals
involved intended to subsequently use themes and ideas developed
in the course for partisan purposes, but it was difficult to impute
that intent to the entire organization. In light of the approach we
will see in the Empower America ruling, discussed in Part IV.D.2, it
is interesting to note that the IRS conceded that “conservative” did
69
not equate to “Republican” in the PFF ruling.
66. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-36-002 (Sept. 8, 1989).
67. The TAM was unpublished, but its full text was made available by the
organization. I.R.S., Tech. Adv. Mem. (Dec. 1, 1998), in 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY
24-25 (Feb. 5, 1999).
68. Id. The ruling also concluded that the organization did not operate to
substantially further private partisan interests. The TAM distinguished American
Campaign Academy v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989), on several grounds: the PFF
course was not a direct outgrowth of an official party organization’s activities; its
funding sources were not partisan; there was no evidence of political bias in
admission of students because the course was offered through established colleges;
and the material in the course was not explicitly biased towards a party.
69. Another 501(c)(3) organization involved in activities related to PFF, the
Abraham Lincoln Opportunity Foundation (ALOF), lost its exemption prior to
the PFF ruling. Announcement 99-45, 1999-1 C.B. 927. Because ALOF had
already been dissolved by the time the IRS ruled for PFF, ALOF lacked standing to
challenge its own revocation. Abraham Lincoln Opportunity Found. v. Comm’r,
2000 WL 1161109 (T.C. 2000). For a time the matter remained as another nonprecedential application of the facts and circumstances test leading to revocation
of an organization’s 501(c)(3) status. However, in an unusual move, the IRS
agreed to reopen the ALOF matter through its “independent review process”—a
newly created and previously little-known process the IRS created to review
difficult cases. See Statement of Callaway Foundations on IRS’s Reversal of Exemption
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Both of these cases represent situations where the IRS’s failure
to find campaign intervention and impose sanctions has drawn
criticism from commentators.
Given the Service’s extreme
reluctance to issue any precedential rulings that could be taken to
encourage “indirect” or surreptitious campaign intervention, it
seems likely that these two cases stand simply as illustrations of the
difficulties of administering the ambiguous “facts and
circumstances” test. A determined organization with sufficient
time and resources to bring to the fight may be able to forestall
negative IRS action after a protracted battle. However, this does
not indicate that organizations that seek to follow the legal rules, or
that lack the resources to engage in a lengthy legal battle, can
engage in similar activities with impunity.
B. 501(c)(3) Election-Related Activities as Private Benefit
Campaign intervention seems to require one or more
candidates involved in a specific election, but it is also problematic
70
for a 501(c)(3) to promote partisan interests more generally. The
seminal case applying the private benefit doctrine to the
advancement of partisan interests is American Campaign Academy v.
71
Commissioner. The American Campaign Academy was formed to
train campaign workers, which was previously part of the function
conducted by the National Republican Congressional Committee
72
(NRCC). Although the Academy had no explicit requirements
regarding students’ party affiliation, there was evidence suggesting
a Republican slant on the admissions panel as a matter of
Revocation, 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 94-59 (May 15, 2003) (noting that Internal
Revenue Manual § 1.54.1 regulations published Jan. 2002 rebut allegations that
the process was secret). Upon review, the IRS retroactively restored ALOF’s
501(c)(3) status. See I.R.S. Announcement 2003-30, 2003-1 C.B. 929. The ALOF
review, and the process by which it was conducted, led to a great deal of
controversy, and the IRS soon after ended its independent review process. See
Fred Stokeld, IRS Abandons Process that Restored Exemptions to Gingrich Groups, 42
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 339 (2003).
70. See generally I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). There is not, of course, any requirement
that candidates be specifically identified. For example, urging voters to “vote prochoice” would likely be considered to promote the election of candidates widely
understood to be pro-choice, even if the organization’s message did not identify
particular candidates. Furthermore, it appears that attempts to provide benefits to
political parties or PACs will also violate the campaign intervention prohibition as
a form of indirect intervention for or against the candidates supported or opposed
by the party or committee.
71. 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
72. Id. at 1053.
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practice. Other evidence and inferences indicated that most if
not all of the Academy’s graduates went to work for Republican
74
candidates.
The instructional program was conceded to be
legitimately educational, but portions of the curriculum indicated
an explicit bias towards Republican interests, with no
75
corresponding examination of Democratic materials. Finally, the
76
organization’s primary source of funding was the NRCC.
Based on these facts, the court concluded that the IRS had
correctly determined that the Academy did not qualify as a
501(c)(3) because it operated substantially to further the private
77
interests of Republican entities and candidates. The idea that a
legitimate educational program could be conducted so as to
78
impermissibly advance private interests was not novel. American
Campaign Academy established that the interests of partisan entities
79
constitute private interests.
IV. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES BY 501(C)(4)S
A. Primary Social Welfare Purpose Excludes Political Activities
Organizations operating under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) may engage
in certain election-related activities too partisan for 501(c)(3)s, but
80
there are limits imposed by the 501(c)(4)’s tax-exempt status.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) describes organizations “operated
81
Somewhat
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare.”
counter to what one might expect, “operated exclusively” has been
interpreted in the associated regulations to mean that the
organization “is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the

73. Id. at 1056.
74. Id. at 1060.
75. Id. at 1070–71.
76. Id. at 1070.
77. Id. at 1078–79.
78. This point was noted in an extended discussion of this case published in
the 2002 Continuing Professional Education text. 2002 ELECTION YEAR ISSUES CPE,
supra note 37 app. II, at 452.
79. Am. Campaign Academy, 92 T.C. at 1077–79. The court declined to
consider whether Republican entities and candidates could constitute a charitable
class that would be the appropriate recipient of 501(c)(3) benefits, despite the
large size of the class. Id. The partisan affiliation indicated that the interests
defining the class were private. Id.
80. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)–(4).
81. Id. § 501(c)(4).
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common good and general welfare of the people of the
82
The regulations further provide that “the
community.”
promotion of social welfare does not include direct or indirect
participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or
83
in opposition to any candidate for public office.” For the sake of
convenience, this activity that may not be primary for a 501(c)(4)
will be referred to as “political activity.”
Revenue Ruling 81-95 states affirmatively what is implied in the
501(c)(4) regulations: that 501(c)(4)s may engage in political
84
activity so long as they primarily conduct social welfare activities.
The organization in question carried on what was characterized as
“certain activities involving participation and intervention in
political campaigns.” Apparently these activities were fairly direct:
“financial assistance and in-kind services.” The ruling stated as a
fact that the organization was primarily engaged in activities
designed to promote social welfare. Thus, its legal conclusion was
reached quickly: “[A]n organization may carry on lawful political
activities and remain exempt under § 501(c)(4) as long as it is
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990) (emphasis
added).
83. Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii). Unfortunately, no publicly available
regulatory history sheds any light on the rationale underlying adoption of the IRS
interpretation that social welfare activities do not include political activity. Such
an explanation could be extraordinarily useful to organizations and their advisors
attempting to understand and comply with the limitation on 501(c)(4) political
activity. However, as noted in a recent IRS instructional article, a 1969 General
Counsel’s Memorandum reached a similar conclusion with regard to 501(c)(5)
and (c)(6) organizations, reasoning that while the content of legislation may be
readily identified with the organization’s exempt labor or business purposes,
“support of a candidate for public office necessarily involves the organization in
the total political attitudes and positions of the candidate.” Gen. Couns. Mem.
34,233 (Dec. 3, 1969), quoted in 2002 ELECTION YEAR ISSUES CPE supra note 37, at
433. The CPE article suggests that, “This rationale would appear to apply to other
types of exempt organizations.” Id. at 433. In other words, 501(c)(4), 501(c)(5)
and 501(c)(6) organizations may lobby to an unlimited extent on issues germane
to their exempt purposes, but because supporting a candidate furthers positions
entirely unrelated to those purposes, such activities are not part of those in which
the organization must primarily be engaged.
Note that if this is indeed the rationale for the restriction on 501(c)(4)
political activity, it arguably does not support extending the definition as far as the
reach of the prohibition on 501(c)(3) campaign intervention. For instance, voter
education activities that focus on social welfare issues might reasonably be argued
to be “germane” to a 501(c)(4)’s purpose of promoting a position on those issues,
yet because the materials suggest a preference for candidates that share the
organization’s view on the issues they would be impermissible for a 501(c)(3) to
produce or distribute.
84. Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.
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primarily engaged in activities that promote social welfare.”
What the regulations and rulings for 501(c)(4)s do not tell us
is precisely what constitutes political activity. Existing authority is
both scant and contradictory, and the IRS appears to have adopted
a “facts and circumstances” approach similar to the analysis used to
determine when an activity constitutes campaign intervention for a
86
501(c)(3).
In addition, the uncertainty for 501(c)(4)s is
compounded by the lack of a clear standard to determine what
activities an organization is “primarily engaged in.” Rather, the IRS
has held that “[a]ll facts and circumstances are taken into account
87
in determining an [501(c)(4)] organization’s primary activity.”
An only slightly more detailed description appeared in a 1995 CPE
article:
Whether an organization is “primarily engaged” in
promoting social welfare is a “facts and circumstances”
determination. Relevant factors include the amount of
funds received from and devoted to particular activities;
other resources used in conducting such activities, such as
buildings and equipment; the time devoted to activities
(by volunteers as well as employees); the manner in which
the organization’s activities are conducted; and the
88
purposes furthered by various activities.

85. Id.
86. See Raymond Chick & Amy Henchey, Political Organizations and IRC
501(c)(4), EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995, 192, 197-98 (1995)
[hereinafter 1995 501(C)(4) POLITICAL CPE] available at http://www.irs.
ustreas.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicm95.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2004) (“IRC
501(c)(4) does not define political campaign activities; instead, the definition and
interpretation of terms used has occurred principally under IRC 501(c)(3). . . .
[W]hether an organization has participated or intervened in a political campaign
is a ‘facts and circumstances’ test.”).
87. Rev. Rul. 68-45, 1968-1 C.B. 259.
88. 1995 501(C)(4) POLITICAL CPE, supra note 86, at 192.
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B. 501(c)(4) “Political Activity” as 501(c)(3) “Campaign Intervention”
1. Precedential Authority Suggesting Congruence of 501(c)(4)
Political Activity and 501(c)(3) Campaign Intervention
As discussed above, organizations operating under § 501(c)(3)
may not “participate in, or intervene in . . . any political campaign
89
on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office,”
language clearly echoed in the 501(c)(4) regulations that set out
activity that may not be primary for a 501(c)(4). It is highly likely
that the intent in drafting the 501(c)(4) regulatory language was to
mirror the set of activities that constitute campaign intervention
under § 501(c)(3). This interpretation is consistent with principles
of statutory interpretation—that absent evidence to the contrary,
one should read similar language to mean similar things.
It is notable that implementing regulations under § 501(c)(3)
expressly state the interpretation that the campaign intervention
90
prohibition is limited to candidates for “elective public office.”
No authority expressly limits the scope of 501(c)(4) political
activity to campaigns for elective office. However, the 501(c)(3)
regulations did not purport to be imposing an additional limitation
that would narrow the statutory prohibition. Rather, they set forth
a clarifying reading. The phrase “political campaign” is generally
understood to refer to elections. It is reasonable to read the
language of the 501(c)(4) regulations similarly, so that 501(c)(4)
political activity would relate only to campaigns for elected public
91
office.
Only one precedential ruling addresses a specific activity that
was found to be political, and therefore not permissible as the
primary activity of a 501(c)(4). Revenue Ruling 67-368 says that
rating candidates, even on a nonpartisan basis, is political activity
92
that may not be primary for a 501(c)(4). This is consistent with
finding 501(c)(3) campaign intervention and 501(c)(4) political
activity to be the same thing, given that, as noted above, other
89. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(iii) (as amended in 1990).
91. Other advocacy relating to non-elected public office (e.g. appointed
judges), or elected non-public offices (e.g. corporate officers), would not be
covered in the definition of 501(c)(4) political activity and presumably would be
acceptable as promotion of social welfare, so long as it was linked to the
organization’s social welfare purposes.
92. Rev. Rul. 67-368, 1967-2 C.B. 194.
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rulings have found that such activity would constitute
93
impermissible campaign intervention if conducted by a 501(c)(3).
Thus, this Revenue Ruling suggests, but does not necessarily
require, that 501(c)(4) political activity is described by the same set
of activities as 501(c)(3) campaign intervention.
In reaching its conclusion that 501(c)(4)s may engage in
political activities, Revenue Ruling 81-95 cites Revenue Ruling 67368 and, in passing, existing 501(c)(3) rulings for other examples
94
of what constitutes campaign intervention. Thus, although it is
not necessary to the conclusion of the ruling, Revenue Ruling 81-95
demonstrates an assumption that anything that constitutes
prohibited 501(c)(3) campaign intervention will be 501(c)(4)
political activity.
It has been widely assumed that, whatever the definition of
501(c)(4) “political activity” includes that is not the promotion of
social welfare, it cannot logically include a broader set of activities
than is covered by 501(c)(3) campaign intervention. There is no
authority suggesting that something might constitute political
activity for a 501(c)(4) and yet not be campaign intervention for a
501(c)(3), and there is no apparent policy reason to impose any
95
such rule. Charitable activities (i.e., permissible for a 501(c)(3))
certainly promote social welfare; although social welfare is likely a
broader concept, covering activities and purposes other than the
96
charitable as well.
Hence, political activity that may not be
primary for a 501(c)(4) does not logically include any activities
permissible for a charitable organization under 501(c)(3).

93. See, e.g., Ass’n of the Bar of New York v. Comm’r, 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1988).
94. Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981 C.B. 332.
95. This assumption is supported by the language of the regulations
concerning “action” organizations. One thing that triggers “action organization”
status is political campaign intervention. The regulations state that such an
organization may not qualify under § 501(c)(3), but “may nevertheless qualify as a
social welfare organization under 501(c)(4).” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(v)
(as amended in 1990).
96. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (including the promotion of social welfare in
the definition of charitable purposes); John Francis Reilly et al., IRC 501(c)(4)
Organizations, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY
2003, I-25 [hereinafter 2003 501(C)(4) CPE], at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/eotopici03.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2004) (“[T]here is considerable overlap
between IRC 501(c)(4) and 501(c)(3). Many organizations could qualify for
exempt status under either Code section.”).
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Non-precedential Support for 501(c)(3)-501(c)(4) Congruence

Other published IRS interpretations are consistent with a
conclusion that 501(c)(4) political activity under the primary
purpose test is coterminous with prohibited 501(c)(3) campaign
intervention. The 2002 CPE text discusses the primary test for
97
501(c)(4)s and cites these authorities. The article does say that a
501(c) organization may make expenditures for political activities
or other things that do not further its exempt purpose so long as
98
they are not the primary activity. Neither that discussion nor the
article on political activity by 501(c) organizations in the 2003 CPE
provides further insight into whether 501(c)(4) political activity is
defined by the same standard that determines 501(c)(3) campaign
99
intervention.
A series of letter rulings in the late 1990s include express
statements by the IRS that the set of activities which are prohibited
campaign intervention for 501(c)(3)s are the same activities that
constitute political activity, which must not be the primary activity
of a 501(c)(4). The rulings arose in the context of taxpayers
seeking a determination that certain activities were exempt function
activity under § 527, and will be discussed in further detail below.
However, because of the way the request was framed, it was easy to
conclude that the proposed activities would be campaign
intervention for a 501(c)(3). The first of these rulings looked at
Revenue Ruling 81-95 and made explicit what was implicit in its
reasoning: that prohibited 501(c)(3) campaign intervention is the
same thing as activity that must be less than primary for a
100
501(c)(4).
Subsequent Private Letter Rulings (PLRs) repeated
this reasoning in sketching out the scope of 527 exempt function
activity. Thus, they provide strong evidence that the IRS interprets
501(c)(4) political activity as described above: the same activities
that constitute prohibited campaign intervention under §
501(c)(3) are those that are considered political activity under §
501(c)(4) and may not be a 501(c)(4) organization’s primary

97. 2002 ELECTION YEAR ISSUES CPE, supra note 37, at 433.
98. Id.
99. John Francis Reilly & Barbara A. Braig Allen, Political Campaign and
Lobbying Activities of IRC 501(c)(4), (c)(5), and (c)(6) Organizations, EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2003 [hereinafter 2003
POLITICAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES CPE], at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/
eotopicl03.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2004).
100. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996).
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activity.
501(c)(4)s seeking to engage in political activity are faced with
a multitude of uncertainties. The lack of clear guidance about the
precise scope of the 501(c)(3) campaign intervention prohibition,
and the nebulous “facts and circumstances” test used to analyze a
given activity is compounded by the application of another “facts
and circumstances” analysis to determine whether an organization
is “primarily” engaged in social welfare activities. 501(c)(4)s
interested in participating in public debate around both elections
and policy issues have little useful guidance to apply in deciding
what to measure and how to weigh it in trying to ensure their
101
primary activities promote social welfare.
D. Private Benefit and 501(c)(4)s
No precedential authority has followed the American Campaign
Academy case (discussed above) to restrict 501(c)(4) political
102
activities. However, several rulings make it clear that the primary
social welfare purpose of a 501(c)(4) must be met by a community
benefit rather than a private benefit, and these rulings directly
connect this concept of private benefit to the private benefit
forbidden as a substantial purpose of 501(c)(3)s. The difference is
quantitative, not qualitative—less than “primary” for 501(c)(4)s
103
versus “substantial” for 501(c)(3)s.
1.

Primary Purpose Versus Private Benefit

An organization will be considered “operated exclusively for
the promotion of social welfare [under 501(c)(4)] if it is primarily
engaged in promoting in some way the common good and general
104
Numerous cases and rulings
welfare of the . . . community.”
contrast the requirement that a 501(c)(4) operate primarily for the
common good and provide community benefit with the provision
of private benefit, which may not be the primary function of a
105
501(c)(4) social welfare organization.
101. See Final Report of the Members of the Exempt Organizations Committee’s Task
Force on Section 501(c)(4) and Politics, reprinted in 45 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 136
(2004) (noting lack of precedential guidance).
102. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
103. See I.R.C. § 501(c).
104. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990).
105. The following discussion touches on a few rulings in order to illustrate
the parameters of the 501(c)(4) private benefit standard. A lengthier summary of
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Otherwise exempt activities and purposes may be tainted if the
organization’s benefits are confined to or targeted towards a
limited class of members. Thus, an organization formed to
promote the common interests of tenants in an apartment complex
does not operate primarily for the common good and general
welfare of the community, but rather for the private benefit of the
106
residents.
In contrast, an organization undertaking similar
advocacy activities was found to qualify as a 501(c)(4) because it
“promote[d] the legal rights of all tenants in a particular
107
community.”
501(c)(4)s may provide greater private benefit than 501(c)(3)s
and still retain exemption. A 501(c)(3) must not engage in any
108
non-exempt activity unless it can be considered “insubstantial,”
but a 501(c)(4) need only ensure that activities not in furtherance
of social welfare are less than primary. The distinction is illustrated
by an organization whose membership was restricted to residents,
109
property owners, and businesses located in a single city block. It
was formed to preserve and beautify the public areas of that block;
activities included planting shrubbery, picking up litter, and paying
110
the city to plant trees.
Although the private benefit to members
was too great to allow exemption under § 501(c)(3), the
community benefit was found to be sufficient for exemption under
111
§ 501(c)(4).
2.

Private Benefit to Partisan Interests

While it has never issued a precedential ruling applying the
concept of 501(c)(4) private benefit in the political context, the
IRS expressly raised the possibility in a proposed denial letter
issued to Empower America, which had applied for recognition as a
501(c)(4): “The private benefit standard used in American Campaign
Academy is similar under § 501(c)(4). The difference is in the
precedents addressing community versus private benefit is found in 2003
501(C)(4) CPE, supra note 96.
106. Rev. Rul. 73-306, 1973-2 C.B. 179.
107. Rev. Rul. 80-206, 1980-2 C.B. 185.
108. Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283
(1945).
109. Rev. Rul. 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210.
110. Id.
111. Id. Cf. Rev. Rul. 68-14, 1968-1 C.B. 243 (stating that an organization
formed to beautify and plant trees in an entire city is operated for charitable
purposes and qualifies for exemption under § 501(c)(3)).
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weighing of the private benefits (i.e., the amount of private
112
benefits), not the standard.”
The Empower America application illustrates an attempt by
the IRS to deny exemption based on a determination that the
applicant was a “partisan issues organization” and hence primarily
113
operated for private benefit.
The organization was founded by
several prominent Republicans with the purpose of advancing a
114
Its activities included publishing
conservative reform agenda.
various materials on public policy issues, holding conferences and
seminars, grass roots lobbying, and conducting “candidate
115
schools.”
In a proposed denial letter, the IRS asserted that Empower
America did not primarily promote social welfare because it was
116
“partisan.” To support this conclusion, the IRS set out a long list
117
of factors that it considered indicated partisan operations. These
included that the organization was controlled by individuals
affiliated with the Republican party; repeated criticism of the
Clinton Administration and its policies such that (it was alleged),
“Clinton Administration” became a negative code word for the
Democratic party; seminars covering topics similar to Republican
policies; and public communications characterized as “partisan”
because of their use of code words and ideas associated with the
118
Republican party. A similar, yet distinct, concern raised was that
the organization operated to further the private benefit of its
119
directors by maintaining their political prominence.
Empower America responded forcefully, disputing the factual
basis for the IRS’s conclusion that it was a “partisan issues
120
organization.” Its reply cited numerous instances of speaking out
on non-political issues (concerns about the degradation of
American popular culture), working together with Democratic
affiliated organizations, criticizing Republicans and opposing
112. Letter from Edward K. Karcher, Chief of Exempt Organizations Technical
Branch 3, to Empower America (Feb. 21, 1997), reprinted in PAUL STRECKFUS'S EO
TAX J., Dec. 22, 1997, at 28, 34.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 28.
115. Id. at 28–29.
116. Id. at 34.
117. Id. at 33.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 34.
120. Letter of Empower America to Edward K. Karcher, (April 21, 1997),
reprinted in id. at 35.
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positions forwarded by some Republican leaders, and working
actively to promote a position of the Clinton Administration
121
(passage of NAFTA).
In sum, Empower America effectively took
issue with the suggestion that “conservative” was a code word for
“Republican.”
The
organization
eventually
received
a
favorable
determination letter based on the adoption of several procedural
safeguards to reassure the IRS that it would not operate for private
122
benefit.
These safeguards included not soliciting or knowingly
accepting funds from Republican entities, requiring any director
who is seeking elective office to take a leave of absence, and
continuing to have the issues it focused on be selected by the Board
based on their importance to the nation and not in coordination
123
with any other organization.
The story of Empower America highlights the possibility of
applying the partisan benefit theory to deny exemption, but also
illustrates the difficulty involved. In all but the most extreme cases,
an organization that is not merely an arm or outgrowth of a
political party will be able to point to differences with partisan
entities sufficient to undermine a partisan private benefit
argument. While conservative interests may have significant
overlap with policies and priorities of the Republican Party, that
alone is not sufficient to find that promoting a conservative agenda
confers impermissible private benefit on partisan Republican
interests.
V. POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY 527S
To read the mainstream press, one would think that political
organizations operating under § 527 of the Internal Revenue Code
were a new creation invented by nefarious political operatives
intent on undermining the campaign finance system. In fact,
124
Congress passed § 527 in 1975. What is “new” about 527s is that,
121. Id. at 36–44.
122. 1997 TAX NOTES TODAY 231-15 (Dec. 2, 1997).
123. Id.
124. Congress passed I.R.C. § 527 to address a concern raised by the IRS.
Until that time, no section of the I.R.C. explicitly exempted political parties,
candidate campaign organizations, and political committees from taxation on the
funds they received. 2002 ELECTION YEAR ISSUES CPE, supra note 37, at 387. In
light of this legislative silence, the IRS proposed a solution in 1973 to exempt
contributions to political organizations from taxation but to subject their
investment income to taxation. Announcement 73-84, 1973-33 I.R.B. 18, restated
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beginning in the late 1990s, there was increased recognition that
527s could be created to engage in activities that met the
requirements of § 527 but that were not sufficiently political to be
regulated by federal, state, or local election authorities. These new
“soft” 527s (so-named because their fundraising for political
purposes was not limited to the “hard money” restrictions of
election law) offered certain strategic advantages under tax and
election law, but the growth of the “soft” 527s almost immediately
125
resulted in increased regulation.
A. “Exempt Function” Under § 527
I.R.C. § 527 governs taxation of “political” organizations,
defined as organizations “organized and operated primarily for the
purpose of directly or indirectly accepting contributions or making
126
“Exempt
expenditures, or both, for an exempt function.”
function,” in turn
means the function of influencing or attempting to
influence the selection, nomination, election, or
appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or
local public office or office in a political organization, or
the election of Presidential or Vice-Presidential electors,
whether or not such individual or electors are selected,
in Rev. Rul. 74-21, 1974-1 C.B. 14 (modified and clarified in Rev. Rul. 74-475, 19742 C.B. 22). However, the IRS indicated that it would not enforce this policy until
Congress had time to consider this issue. Congress acted by passing § 527.
125. Rosemary E. Fei, The Uses of Section 527 Political Organizations, in 1
STRUCTURING THE INQUIRY INTO ADVOCACY 23 (Elizabeth J. Reid ed., 2000) at
http://www.urban.org/advocacyresearch/structuring.html (last visited Oct. 3,
2004).
126. I.R.C. § 527(e)(1). Although technically organizations must merely be
“primarily” engaged in exempt function activities to be tax-exempt under § 527,
the practical standard may be higher. Many, perhaps most, 527 organizations are
actually segregated funds of other organizations. Thus, a 501(c)(4) might
establish a fund for political activities, which the IRS will treat as a 527
organization. See Treas. Reg. § 1.527–2(b)(1) (as amended in 1985). However, if
a segregated fund spends more than an “insubstantial” amount in a year for nonexempt activities, the IRS will not recognize the fund as a separate 527
organization. Id. Substantial expenditures for non-exempt activities over multiple
years may result in the IRS treating the fund as if it had never been exempt from
tax under § 527. Id. Thus, the would-be 527 might find itself in tax-exempt
limbo—unable to qualify as tax-exempt under § 527 because it engaged in
“substantial” non-exempt activities, yet unable to qualify as tax-exempt under any
section of 501(c) because its “primary” purpose is still political activities. The tax
status of such in-between organizations is far from clear.
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127

By referring to these activities as “exempt functions,” § 527
creates a great deal of confusion because, as is clear from the
discussion of 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) political activities above,
527’s “exempt function” describes as “exempt” political activities
that are prohibited or limited for most types of tax-exempt
organizations. Organizations primarily engaged in these political
“exempt functions,” including not only political committees, but
also political parties and candidate campaigns, pay federal income
tax on any investment income but not on contributions they
receive. Furthermore, contributions to 527 organizations are
exempt from the federal gift tax usually imposed on donors that
make gifts in excess of an indexed annual threshold (currently
128
$11,000).
Not only does the I.R.C. definition of political “exempt
function” determine which organizations qualify for this tax
treatment under § 527, but it also determines which activities of
other organizations are subject to tax on political activities under §
527(f). Section 527(f) subjects 501(c) organizations to federal
income tax on an amount equal to the lesser of expenditures they
make for “exempt functions” defined under § 527(e)(2) and the
amount of investment income the 501(c) organization has received
in that year.
Various IRS rulings indicate a broad interpretation of this
standard to apply to most expenditures related to the campaign
process. For instance, expenditures for an election night party
were ruled to be exempt function expenditures as “an inherent
part of . . . the selection process” even though such expenditures
clearly would not be able to influence the actual outcome of the
election and as such could also be permissible for a 501(c)(3)
129
organization. “Testing the waters” or exploratory costs have been
ruled to qualify as exempt function expenditures even when the
130
individual ultimately did not run for the office contemplated.

127.
128.
129.
130.

I.R.C. § 527(e)(2).
Id. § 2501(a)(5).
Rev. Rul. 87-119, 1987-2 C.B. 151, Q&A 1.
See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Mem. 93-20-002 (May 21, 1993).
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Similarities in the Tests

No explicit precedential authority addresses the connection
between “exempt function,” “campaign intervention,” and
“political activity,” but a series of Private Letter Rulings in the late
1990s contained reasoning based on the idea that the standards are
largely, if not entirely, equivalent.
The first of the rulings examining the outer limits of 527
131
exempt function activity appeared in 1996.
It concerned a
501(c)(4) organization that had set up a separate segregated fund
(SSF) to conduct certain activities and sought a ruling that those
activities would constitute a 527 exempt function and that the SSF
132
would be treated as a 527 organization under § 527(f)(3).
The
proposed purpose of the fund was to conduct a voter education
program to raise awareness of the importance of certain issues and
the position of candidates on those issues without engaging in
133
express advocacy for or against any identified candidates.
Although few specific facts remain in the heavily redacted ruling, it
appears that the program would not follow the guidelines set out in
existing guidance on permissible 501(c)(3) voter education.
Issues, for instance, were to be selected not because of “their
134
importance and interest to the electorate as a whole,” but “based
on their importance to [the organization]’s agenda and their
135
expected resonance with the public.” Selected issues and themes
would be “linked to the . . . records and positions of incumbents
and candidates in order to reinforce the significance of those
136
connections in the minds of the voters.”
Voter guides would
report candidates’ positions on issues as well as major campaign
contributors. Distribution would be targeted geographically based
on the organization’s political interests and timed to coincide with
137
political campaigns.
Both voter guides and incumbent voting
131. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996).
132. Id.
133. Engaging in express advocacy would bring the program within the ambit
of the campaign finance laws whose contribution limits and disclosure obligations
the organization was attempting to avoid. See I.R.C. § 527(f)(3).
134. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154, at Situation 2.
135. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996).
136. Id.
137. This last factor is frequently cited as an important consideration in
determining that an activity constitutes 501(c)(3) campaign intervention. It is
obviously relevant in analyzing materials that are purportedly not related to
elections, such as lobbying messages. The significance of timing is less apparent
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records would be designed to indicate the organization’s stance on
the issues covered and to implicitly compare that position to the
views of the candidates and legislators covered.
Other than the statute and regulations, there was no
precedential authority on which to base an analysis of whether
these activities constituted a 527 exempt function. The IRS agreed
with the taxpayer that this program did not come within the areas
138
of permitted voter education set out in existing 501(c)(3) rulings.
It clearly fell on the political side of the campaign intervention line.
It was therefore reasonable to conclude it was exempt function
activity, that is, “influencing or attempting to influence the . . .
139
election . . . of any individual to any . . . public office.”
The ruling then looked at Revenue Ruling 81-95 and
concluded explicitly what was strongly implied in that prior ruling:
that prohibited 501(c)(3) campaign intervention is the same thing
as 501(c)(4) political activity. The ruling went on to say that those
same activities “are, in turn, activities that are exempt functions for
140
a section 527 organization.”
Certainly, regulations under § 527
do state that whether an activity constitutes an exempt function
141
It is only in this last
depends on all the facts and circumstances.
logical step of the ruling, for which no other authority was cited,
that the IRS indicated that the same “facts and circumstances” that
determine 501(c)(3) campaign intervention also define the extent
of the 527 exempt function.
Subsequent rulings have taken this analysis further in finding
that specific activities constituted a 527 exempt function. Letters
issued in 1997 and 1998 addressed what was termed “dual-character
142
activities.”
These were grass roots lobbying messages that served
both legislative and political purposes. The rulings stated that this
activity, although not exclusively directed towards influencing
elections, was nonetheless permissible for a 527 fund because it
143
served an exempt function.
with regard to voter education materials, which are obviously only of use to the
public when made available during an election campaign.
138. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154, at Situation 2; Rev. Rul. 80-282,
1980-2 C.B. 178.
139. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2).
140. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996).
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1985).
142. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-25-036 (Mar. 24, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-08-037 (Nov.
21, 1997).
143. See id. It is uncertain how this analysis would apply to a 501(c)(4)
conducting such activity. It might be considered exempt function activity and
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Finally, in 1999, another letter ruling pushed the 527 envelope
144
even further. The ruling concluded that a whole host of activities
that, at least generically, could be legally conducted by a 501(c)(3),
would be treated as 527 exempt functions based largely on the
intent of the organization, as evidenced by factors such as
targeting, polling, and expert advice about the likely electoral
145
effect of various messages and activities.
The covered activities
included ballot measure advocacy and other lobbying activity,
which had traditionally been presumed permissible for a 501(c)(3)
(and which, therefore, would constitute the promotion of social
146
This ruling opened up the possibility
welfare for a 501(c)(4)).
that this advocacy would be considered campaign intervention if
the organization’s primary purpose in engaging in the ballot
measure work was to increase turnout of voters likely to vote for
identified candidates. Viewed externally, this activity would seem
wholly appropriate for a 501(c)(3), but it could be treated as an
exempt function, apparently, solely because of the taxpayer’s
intent. Because the ruling was issued to a taxpayer seeking to
establish its political motivation, the ruling gives little insight into
how this test might be applied to advocacy by a 501(c)(4) (or
501(c)(3)) that would prefer not to have its ballot measure
activities characterized as political.
In 2000, an IRS ruling determined that an organization
applying for 501(c)(4) status did not qualify because its primary
147
activities were campaign intervention.
Factors supporting that
conclusion also led to a finding that the organization was primarily
operated to conduct 527 exempt functions. There are not enough
facts in the ruling to let us know whether this is based on a belief
that 501(c)(4) political activity and 527 exempt function describe
therefore not part of the 501(c)(4)’s social welfare function. Alternatively, a
501(c)(4) could argue that its activity is primarily directed towards lobbying and
therefore should not be treated as a 527 expenditure.
144. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051 (Mar. 29, 1999).
145. Id.
146. In fact, earlier rulings had also concluded that under certain
circumstances ballot measure activity would be an exempt function.
Communications regarding a ballot measure that prominently featured an
individual’s name and picture were found to be for an exempt purpose although
they did not mention the person’s candidacy. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-30-008 (Apr.
16, 1991). Even if the message did not identify a candidate it could be an exempt
function if the advocacy was carried to encourage turnout of voters favorable to
candidates supporting the issue. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-49-002 (June 30, 1992).
147. Field Serv. Adv. 2000-37-040 (June 19, 2000).
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the same activities, so that 501(c)(4) and 527 are indeed mirror
images of each other, or whether the activities were so clearly
“political” under either section that the distinction did not matter
148
to the conclusion reached.
The problem with using these rulings to understand the
parameters defining 501(c)(4) political activity is that they
responded to requests from taxpayers affirmatively seeking to
characterize their activities as 527 exempt functions. Thus, they
presented their activities as avowedly intended and designed to
influence elections. In light of that approach, it would have been
difficult to conclude that the activities were anything other than
appropriate exempt function activities for a 527 political
organization. However, for 501(c)(4) taxpayers who have not so
carefully mustered evidence of the intent and expected effects of
their actions, the rulings shed little light on the question of how
activities will be judged.
There is also a significant degree of uncertainty about the
treatment of “dual purpose” activities conducted by a 501(c)(4).
For instance, suppose an organization engages in lobbying activities
for the primary purpose of influencing legislation, but talks about a
legislator’s position on the issue using rhetoric that it knows is
likely to influence some voters in an upcoming election. Will this
electoral element cause the activity to be considered political? Or
is the entire activity classified based on the organization’s primary
motivation for conducting it?
Before publication of these rulings, many advisors to
nonprofits had believed that there was a “gray area” open to
501(c)(4)s between the line of 501(c)(3) campaign intervention
and 527 exempt function. Advocacy outside of the 501(c)(3) safe
harbors could be conducted by a 501(c)(4) without risk. By
pushing the lines delimiting 527 and 501(c)(3) activities together
in the sphere of candidate elections, those rulings seem to have
eliminated any margin of safety available to 501(c)(4)s. Given the
indefinite “facts and circumstances” test that is used to determine
prohibited campaign intervention, exempt organizations previously
thought they could safely protect the exempt status of a 501(c)(3)
organization by conducting any questionable activities with a
501(c)(4). Now they must be concerned about whether this would
cause the 501(c)(4) to be primarily engaged in political activities
148.

Id.
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which, because of its close relationship to the 501(c)(3), could also
jeopardize the 501(c)(3)’s status. Under the reasoning of these
rulings, it is necessary to know the characterization of every activity
carried out so there can be less tolerance for uncertainty. Yet the
rulings use the same nebulous “facts and circumstances” analysis
used in the 501(c)(3) context to identify 527 exempt function
activity, a situation that provides no clear guidance to 501(c)(4)s
seeking to preserve their status.
2.

Distinctions Among the Tests

Section 527 organizations’ exempt functions include activities
not covered by the 501(c)(3) prohibition and presumably also not
political activity for a 501(c)(4). The definition of 527 “exempt
function” in the statute explicitly extends to areas that are not
149
within the 501(c)(3) campaign intervention prohibition.
As
discussed above, 501(c)(3) campaign intervention is explicitly
limited by regulation to “elective public office,” and 501(c)(4)
political activity is implicitly so limited as well. In contrast, the
exempt function of a 527 political organization includes
influencing the “selection, nomination, election, or appointment
of any individual to any Federal, State, or local public office or
150
office in a political organization. . . .” Thus, unlike the 501(c)(3)
prohibition, the statutory definition of exempt function applies to
non-elected public offices, and to office in a political
151
organization.
The regulations do not further delineate the scope of offices
with which the 527 exempt function is concerned. Most of the
examples provided assume an elected office, or do not state
152
However, one
whether the office is elected or appointed.
provision states that expenditures are not for an exempt function
when incurred by a 501(c) organization associated with providing
testimony in support of the confirmation of an individual to a
149. I.R.C. § 527(e)(2).
150. Id.
151. The statute also includes special treatment for newsletter funds
maintained by a candidate or officeholder as a 527 political organization. I.R.C. §
527(g). Newsletter funds, however, may not be used for campaign expenses.
Treas. Reg. § 1.527-7(d) (1980). In addition, paying for expenses associated with a
political office that would be deductible as business expenses if paid by an
individual office holder are treated as an exempt function under the statute.
I.R.C. § 527(e)(2).
152. See Treas. Reg. § 1.527-2(c)(5) (1980).
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cabinet position in response to a written request from a
153
Congressional committee. From the context, it is not completely
clear whether this is intended to set out a narrow exception for a
501(c) organization, or to state more broadly that these
expenditures would not be for an exempt function if conducted by
a 527 organization. It is certainly possible to read this example as
defining a narrow region (invited Congressional testimony on
cabinet appointments, and possibly other positions subject to
Senate confirmation) where activity by a 527 will be treated as
exempt function but the same activity by a 501(c)(4) is not
154
considered an exempt function.
Beyond the language of the statute and regulations there is no
precedential authority to illuminate the extent to which 527
exempt function covers activity outside the area defined as
501(c)(3) campaign intervention, but some non-precedential
guidance supports distinctions between the tests. A 1988 General
Counsel Memorandum (GCM) confirmed that 527 exempt
function and 501(c)(3) campaign intervention are not
155
coterminous.
It concluded that 501(c)(3)s may seek to influence
appointment of federal judges because judges do not hold elective
156
public offices.
The ruling further concludes that influencing
judicial appointments is a 527 exempt function activity that triggers
the 527(f) tax (discussed in Part II above) if conducted by a 501(c)
157
organization.
Announcement 88-114 publicized the IRS’s belief
158
that this is the correct conclusion and solicited public comment.
Comment was also sought on whether the proposed application of
the 527(f) tax to 501(c) organizations that seek to influence
judicial appointments should be only prospective, as many such
organizations, particularly 501(c)(3)s, had not been aware that this
159
activity might be considered an exempt function.
No further
guidance has been forthcoming and the most recent IRS
Continuing Professional Education text on Election-Year Activities

153. Id. § 1.527-6(b)(4).
154. Similarly, illegal expenditures are not for an exempt function, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.527-2(c)(4) (1980), but presumably would be treated as campaign intervention
for a 501(c)(3) if made to influence an election.
155. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,694 (Jan. 21, 1988).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Announcement 88-114, 1988-37, I.R.B. 26 (Aug. 30, 1988).
159. Id.
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states that no final determination of the issue has been made.
Nonetheless, the GCM remains as a non-precedential indication
that 501(c)(3)s may legally engage in some activities that constitute
a 527 exempt function.
As discussed above, an activity or purpose that comes within
the ambit of “charitable” and is therefore permissible for a
501(c)(3) should per se qualify as the promotion of social welfare
161
for a 501(c)(4).
Thus, the logic of this GCM indicates that a
501(c)(4) could be organized to primarily attempt to influence
federal judicial or executive branch appointments and qualify
162
under 501(c)(4).
On the other hand, if this is exempt function
activity for a 527, this same organization could equally well qualify
as a 527 political organization.
Of course, the conclusions of GCM 39,694 and Announcement
88-114 caused substantial controversy and have never been adopted
in precedential guidance. But based on the statutory language
there are less controversial examples of activity that could be
primary for either a 501(c)(4) or a 527 organization, such as
attempting to influence elections or appointments of individuals to
office in political parties. For instance, if an organization’s purpose
is to promote social welfare by increasing the number of AfricanAmericans in important leadership positions, it might choose to
further this purpose by advocating for the selection of a specific
African-American as chair of a national party committee. Were the
organization to engage in this activity exclusively (or primarily), it
would appear to be equally able to qualify as exempt under either §
501(c)(4) or § 527.
There may be a fairly narrow set of activities that constitute a
527 exempt function but not campaign intervention for a 501(c)
organization, and few organizations are engaged primarily in
carrying out these activities. Nonetheless, it is possible under
(relatively) undisputed provisions of current law that an
organization’s primary activities could simultaneously be the
promotion of social welfare and 527 exempt function. At least to
this extent, the exempt function of a 527 organization does not
define 501(c)(4) political activity. If it is correct, as stated in the
PLRs discussed above, that “any activities constituting prohibited
political intervention by a 501(c)(3) organization are activities that
160.
161.
162.

2002 ELECTION YEAR ISSUES CPE, supra note 37, at 397 n. 27.
See discussion, supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,694 (Jan. 21, 1988).
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must be less than the primary activities of a 501(c)(4) organization,
which are, in turn, activities that are exempt functions for a 527
163
organization,”
then this can be true only with regard to
campaigns for elected office. In other words, despite the broad
wording adopted, the rulings at most indicate that seeking to
influence an election and intervening in a campaign represent the
same thing. Because the taxpayers seeking those PLRs were not
seeking to influence the selection of individuals for other office,
their reasoning did not address the overlap between exempt
functions and 501(c) activity in those cases.
VI. STRATEGIC ISSUES DRIVING CHOICE OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
Having defined (insofar as possible) the law governing
election-related activities by 501(c)(3)s, 501(c)(4)s, and 527s, we
turn now to the strategic issues driving political operatives to
choose one form over another. As discussed below, choices are
often not made to thwart the policy goals of campaign finance
regulation, but are rather made as rational efforts to preserve
resources and reduce administrative burdens.
A. Tax on 501(c) Political Activities Under § 527(f)
The most commonly discussed factor pushing political
activities into 527 organizations is the potential tax imposed under
§ 527(f) on 501(c) organizations engaged in political activity.
Section 527(f) subjects 501(c) organizations to tax on the
lesser of their investment income or their exempt function
164
expenditures. Regulations set out the application of this tax, and
in doing so create some exceptions that presumably would be
exempt function activities otherwise, but will not trigger the 527(f)
tax, despite statutory language stating that all expenditures by a
501(c) organization for an exempt function trigger the 527(f)
165
tax. In addition, a recent Revenue Ruling discussed the factors to
be considered in determining whether a 501(c)’s activity is a 527

163. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-52-026 (Oct. 1, 1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-25-036 (Mar. 24,
1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-08-037 (Nov. 21, 1997).
164. I.R.C. § 527(f)(1). The policy rationale frequently put forward to explain
this tax is that it levels the playing field between 527 organizations, which must
always pay this investment income tax, and 501(c)s, which are subjected to it only
if they venture into the area of activity occupied by the 527s.
165. Id.
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exempt function, and set out a number of very useful examples.
1.

Explicit Exceptions from Definition of “Exempt Function”

Regulations provide two explicit areas where activity by a
501(c) organization will not trigger application of tax under §
527(f)—that is, activities that are excluded from the definition of
167
exempt function when conducted by a 501(c) organization.
These exceptions apply specifically to the imposition of 527(f) tax
on 501(c)s, rather than as part of the general definition of exempt
functions, and thus presumably describe things that would
otherwise be 527 exempt function activities.
The first of these explicit exceptions applies to organizations
that appear “before any legislative body in response to a written
request by such body for the purpose of influencing the
appointment or confirmation of an individual to a public office,
any expenditure directly related to such appearance is not treated
168
as an expenditure for an exempt function.”
Because of the
narrow wording of this provision, it sounds particularly like an
exception, implying that other advocacy on appointments or
confirmations to a covered office would be taxable activity. If that
is correct, it is probable that invited testimony on a legislative
confirmation by a 527 organization would count as an exempt
function, but not be considered an exempt function for purposes
169
of the 527(f) tax when conducted by a 501(c)(4). Of course, this
conclusion is difficult to reconcile with the clear statutory language

166. Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-4 I.R.B. 328. It may be worth noting that Rev. Rul.
81-95 mentioned the 527(f) tax as potentially applying to a 501(c)(4)'s political
activities, but did not assume that all activities that constitute campaign
intervention are 527 exempt function activities that trigger the tax. It was carefully
worded only to say that those expenditures that are for a 527 exempt function
would subject the 501(c)(4) to tax under 527(f). It is unclear whether this
implicitly suggests that 501(c)(4) political activity was not considered to be
identical to 527 exempt function, or if the question was simply not addressed.
Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332.
167. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.527-6(b)(4), (5) (1980). See also supra notes 154–55.
168. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(b)(4) (1980).
169. Id. This exception is also set out in an example which is part of the
regulations defining a 527 exempt function. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-2(c)(5)(vi) (as
amended in 1985). However, the example is limited to the activities of a 501(c)
organization. It is unclear whether its inclusion in that section indicates that
invited testimony is universally excluded from the definition of exempt function
or, as appears more likely, it is simply included there along with other examples.
Id.
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170

about application of the tax.
The second explicit exception provides that “nonpartisan”
voter registration and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns are also
not treated as exempt function activity when conducted by a 501(c)
171
organization.
To qualify as “nonpartisan,” the campaign may not
172
be explicitly identified with a party or candidate. The regulations
do not impose any additional limitation on these voter involvement
activities. It is likely that the intent in drafting this provision was to
limit the exception to 501(c)(3)-permissible activity, but the
regulations explicitly state only the one requirement. Narrowly
focused, issue-based voter involvement messages might be
considered prohibited for a 501(c)(3), and indeed may be
intended to influence an election. Nonetheless, there is a viable
reading of this exception that would exclude such communications
from the definition of exempt function for 527(f) purposes. By
expressly stating this as an exception, the regulations certainly
suggest that voter involvement campaigns not identified with a
candidate or party could also potentially be carried out by a 527
organization and be considered an exempt function. Statements
173
made at the time of publication of the final regulations suggest
that this provision was intended to cover GOTV and voter
registration activities permitted by federal and state election laws.
Because those laws allow 501(c)(4)s to engage in voter motivation
campaigns that focus more narrowly on divisive issues than would
be permitted to a 501(c)(3), it is at least arguable that this
exception exempts from 527(f) tax some activities that would
constitute 501(c)(3) campaign intervention.
The 1999 PLR also concluded that voter registration, voter
motivation, and GOTV communications would be treated as
exempt functions when conducted by the 527 organization, even if
174
they were not always identified with a specific party or candidate.
It is not clear whether this was intended as a narrowing reading of §
1.527-6(b)(5), interpreting it to apply only to 501(c)(3)-permissible
activities. It could also be confirmation that there is a set of voteractivation messages that will be treated as exempt function when

170. The statutory language states that all expenditures by a 501(c)
organization for an exempt function trigger the 527(f) tax. I.R.C. § 527.
171. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(b)(5) (1980).
172. Id.
173. T.D. 7744, 1981-1 C.B. 360.
174. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051 (Mar. 29, 1999).
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conducted by a 527, yet not trigger the tax when conducted by a
501(c)(4) due to the exception.
The explicit exceptions from 527(f) tax set out in the
regulations for confirmation hearings, invited testimony, and voter
activation work set out activities that are not taxable when engaged
in by a 501(c)(4), but that apparently (and logically) could also be
conducted by a 527 and treated as exempt function.
2.

Reserved Regulations

When regulations under § 527 were first proposed, a number
of comments pointed out that there are sound reasons that a 527
tax on 501(c) organizations should be applied consistent with
provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) that
permit 501(c) organizations to engage in certain activities without
175
establishing a separate segregated fund.
Lack of consistency
between FECA and tax law would create a significant burden on
176
these organizations. In order to maximize their use of non-PAC
money as permitted by campaign finance laws, and yet avoid paying
the 527(f) tax, they would be required to create two SSFs (a
traditional PAC and an SSF for 527 exempt function expenditures
that fall outside the regulatory scope of FECA). This would double
the organization’s bookkeeping and administrative burden,
177
contrary to at least one expression of Congressional intent.
A Congressional desire to maintain consistency between the
two sets of laws was also expressed:
In prescribing such rules, regulations, and forms under
this section, the [Federal Election] Commission and the
Internal Revenue Service shall consult and work together
to promulgate rules, regulations, and forms which are
mutually consistent. The Commission shall report to the
175.

Those comments are discussed in 2002 ELECTION YEAR ISSUES CPE,

supra note 37, at 437.
176. As noted earlier in this article, we use “PAC” as a simpler and more easily
understood term than the more technically accurate language describing a
political committee subject to the state or federal legal restrictions, such as FECA’s
restrictions on the size and source of contributions. In the context of this
discussion, such a “PAC” refers to a separate segregated fund maintained in
compliance with the restrictions of applicable campaign finance laws.
177. “It was our intention, in order to promote uniformity and simplicity of
regulation, that the tax law match the then existing [Federal Election] Campaign
Act restrictions.” 122 CONG. REC. 12,200 (1976) (statement of Rep. Ullman).
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Congress annually on the steps it has taken to comply with
178
this subsection.
On the other hand, Congress had clearly spoken elsewhere to
say that a 501(c)(4) organization would be subject to tax under
527(f) if it “expends any amount during the taxable year directly
(or through another organization) for an exempt function (within
179
the meaning of subsection 527(e)). . . .” The statute includes no
exceptions. The legislative history indicates an intent that 501(c)
organizations and 527s should be treated on an equal basis for tax
180
purposes to the extent they engage in the same activities.
Unable to satisfactorily resolve this tension, the IRS adopted
final regulations that put off making a final decision on the tax
181
treatment of electoral activity permitted by campaign finance law.
Two types of expenditures by 501(c) organizations will be taxable
exempt function expenditures only to the extent provided in
182
sections of regulations which both state only, “Reserved.”
Upon
publication of the final § 527 regulations, the IRS indicated that
any tax imposed on a 501(c) based on activities falling within the
ambit of the reserved regulations would be applied only
183
prospectively.
One class of expenditures clearly covered by the reserved
regulations is indirect costs—expenditures for establishing,
184
maintaining, and fundraising for an SSF.
The other category is
expenditures “which are otherwise allowable under the Federal
185
There is no
Election Campaign Act or similar State statute.”
precedential authority further explaining the scope of this
provision. Based solely on the published regulations, one could
read them to exempt from taxation all those expenditures legal
under federal campaign finance law, that is, those short of express
advocacy, coordination with a candidate, or electioneering
186
communications.
This approach would be consistent with the
178. 2 U.S.C. § 438(f) (2000).
179. I.R.C. § 527(f)(1). The tax is imposed on the lesser of the organization’s
exempt function expenditures or its net investment income. Id.
180. S. REP. NO. 93-1357 at 7505 (1974).
181. T.D. 7744, 1981-1 C.B. 360.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(b)(2) (1980).
185. Id. § 1.527-6(b)(3).
186. Recent amendments to FECA added restrictions on “electioneering
communications” and further modified the law. See 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (West

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

41

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 2
KINGSLEYPOMERANZ- (LS & CB).DOC

96

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

10/3/2004 7:38:12 PM

[Vol. 31:1

reasoning behind the decision to reserve the regulations, which was
to maintain consistency between tax and election law.
Some IRS texts suggest a more limited reading. The IRS
discussion of the final 527 regulations cites some specific activities
187
expressly permitted by the statutory language of FECA.
Subsequent CPE texts have reiterated that member
communications and SSF administrative and fundraising costs
188
determine the coverage of this reserved section.
The drafters of
the regulations clearly had these categories in mind, but they may
not have focused more specifically on the entire range of activities
legally permitted under FECA. It is uncertain how to apply the
reserved regulations to other activities that are clearly permissible
under FECA, at least as constitutional limits on FECA’s scope have
been developed in the case law. In other words, it is uncertain
whether the exception applies to activities expressly permitted by
the statutory language of FECA, or more broadly, to those activities
legal for a 501(c)(4) under the campaign finance law as
189
interpreted by regulatory and judicial decisions.
In addition, there is no further authority as to what a “similar
state statute” is. Is it one that regulates campaign finance, or one
that allows a corporation to create an SSF? Particularly in light of
the extraordinarily broad scope of different state campaign finance
laws, this creates further uncertainty for 501(c)(4)s engaged in
advocacy related to state office, officeholders, and policies. A
logically consistent resolution is that the reserved sections would
not protect legal state activities that would not be legal for the
organization under FECA. But the devil is in the details. If a state
law differs only slightly from FECA in what it permits, will activities
190
falling into that small area of discrepancy trigger the 527(f) tax?
2004).
187. T.D. 7744, 1981-1 C.B. 360.
188. See, e.g., 2003 POLITICAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES CPE, supra note 99, at L-10.
189. Further complexity is added by the fact that unlike most corporations
certain 501(c)(4) organizations, termed Qualified Nonprofit Corporations, are
permitted by FEC regulations (implementing the holding in Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986)) to engage in express
advocacy for or against federal candidates. Presumably this expressly political
advocacy would be treated as a 527 exempt function regardless of the correct
interpretation of the reserved regulations.
190. For instance, FEC regulations permit “occasional, isolated or incidental”
use of corporate resources by employees who are volunteering for political
campaigns. Occasional use is defined to be no more than four hours per month.
11 C.F.R. § 114.9 (1980). If a state law allows a corporation to permit volunteers to
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A 1984 Technical Advice Memorandum concluded that a
union’s contributions to state candidates, permitted by applicable
191
campaign finance law, would trigger the 527 tax.
It did not
clarify the underlying reasoning by deciding, for instance, that the
state law was not “similar.” Rather, the ruling cited what its
author(s) perceived as clear congressional intent to impose the 527
tax on all direct political expenditures by a 501(c) organization. It
states that “we can see no reason to conclude that anything other
than indirect political expenditures would be covered” by the
192
reserved sections of the regulations. This is obviously too broadly
stated. Even the IRS texts that read the scope of “permitted by
FECA” narrowly would permit some activities beyond indirect
expenditures, for example, express advocacy communications to
members.
When the 527 regulations were promulgated, the IRS
indicated that these sections were reserved pending resolution of
193
the relationship between tax law and FECA. This resolution may
prove difficult to achieve administratively. Certainly it would be
difficult to craft a regulation explicitly defining an activity
simultaneously as an exempt function for a 527 and not an exempt
function (that is, not taxable) for a 501(c), yet avoid a conflict with
the plain language of I.R.C. § 527(f). The desire for consistency
between FEC and IRS regulation may be irreconcilable with the
statutory language of 527 imposing a tax on any exempt function
expenditure by a 501(c)(4).
Hence, “resolution” of the
relationship between campaign finance and tax laws may require
legislative action. There is a persistent tension between the two
goals of leveling the playing field (by imposing 527(f) tax on
501(c)(4) exempt function activities) and consistent administration
of tax and campaign finance laws (so organizations have only one
set of administrative rules to apply).

use its offices up to eight hours per month, would the value of the additional four
hours’ use constitute a taxable exempt function expenditure?
191. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-02-003 (Sept. 27, 1984).
192. Id.
193. 181 T.D. 7744, 1981-1 C.B. 360.
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194

Revenue Ruling 2004-6

In December 2003, the IRS did something both rare and
surprising: it released a precedential ruling in the exempt
195
The ruling expressly addresses only the
organization area.
application of § 527(f) investment income tax to 501(c)(4),
196
501(c)(5), and 501(c)(6) organizations.
Specifically, it discusses
whether expenditures for certain public communications should be
characterized as 527 exempt functions and thus trigger the tax.
Despite the fact that the discussion and examples are limited to the
context of campaigns for elected public office, exempt
organizations of all stripes are looking to this new ruling with great
interest.
After restating the familiar refrain that “all the facts and
circumstances must be considered,” the ruling goes on to provide
197
representative lists of factors that will be taken into account.
Summarizing the relevant factors illustrated in the ruling, a public
communication is more likely to be deemed a 527 exempt function
if it: identifies a candidate for office; is timed to coincide with an
198
electoral campaign; targets voters in a particular election;

194. Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-4 I.R.B. 328. The authors are not generally
inclined to believe in either conspiracy theories or numerology, and hence ascribe
no significance whatsoever to the fact that this major new IRS ruling on political
campaign activities by nonprofits bears the same number, 2004-6, as the FEC’s
notice of proposed rulemaking on political campaign activities by nonprofits.
195. Id. This ruling is discussed in this section because on its terms it directly
addresses only the application of the § 527(f) investment income tax to 501(c)
organizations. Nevertheless, it certainly would provide valuable guidance to § 527
organizations interested in determining whether their activities constitute exempt
functions. In light of the substantial overlap between the 527 exempt function
and 501(c)(3) campaign intervention, the ruling is also of great interest in
determining whether election-year advocacy activities would jeopardize a
501(c)(3)’s exempt status. IRS officials have acknowledged this relevance in
public remarks. See Judith Kindell, Remarks, in 43 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 244, 245
(2004) (statements of Judith Kindell of the IRS regarding Rev. Rul. 2004-6).
196. Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-4 I.R.B. 328.
197. Id.
198. Id. The meaning of “targets” as used here is not further elaborated. Id.
In all the examples, communications are directed at an elected official’s
constituents, who are naturally the logical audience for both electoral and bona
fide lobbying communications. Id. In the opinion of the authors, this factor
alone, without further elaboration, is not particularly helpful in distinguishing 527
exempt function communications from other advocacy messages. See Judith
Kindell, Remarks, in 43 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 244, 245 (2004) (“[a]ll we intended
when we said the communication targets the voters is that it was directed at the
same voters.”).
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identifies the candidate’s position on a public policy issue; focuses
on an issue that has been raised as distinguishing candidates in the
campaign; and is not part of an ongoing series of substantially
similar advocacy communications by the organization on the same
199
issue.
A public communication is less likely to be considered an
exempt function if it: identifies legislation or another specific event
outside the organization’s control that the organization hopes to
influence; is timed to coincide with an event outside the
organization’s control that the organization hopes to influence;
identifies the candidate solely as an official in a position to act on
the issue; or identifies the candidate solely as a key sponsor of
200
legislation.
These factors are then applied in a series of specific
201
examples. Some are unsurprising in their conclusions, but a few
take on more challenging situations.
For instance, an
advertisement that encourages citizens to “Tell Governor E what
you think about our under-funded schools” constitutes a 527exempt function, even though the text contains no references to
202
the Governor as a candidate or the pending election. Key to this
outcome seem to be the facts that the opposing candidate has
raised funding for public education as a campaign issue, the
advertisement is not part of a series of substantially similar advocacy
communications by the organization on the same issue, it is aired
on radio shortly before the election, and there is no pending
legislative vote or other activity the organization may be hoping to
203
influence.
Thus, while the message on its face appears to be
solely about a public policy issue, an inquiry into external
circumstances compels a conclusion that it will be treated as
political campaign activity.
The final example also concludes that a television
advertisement with no reference to voting, elections, or candidacy
204
nonetheless constitutes an exempt function.
The critical factors
here appear to be timing, identifying a public official’s position as
opposed to that of the organizations, and probably most critically
that the ad is not tied to an event outside the organization’s

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., Situation 4.
Id.
Id., Situation 6.
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control, but rather calls for moratorium on imposition of the death
penalty, a call that the IRS presumably believes could have been
made at another time if the true intent was not to influence a
pending election.
This ruling is the first precedential guidance issued that helps
clarify the ambiguity discussed above regarding the meaning of the
205
reserved sections of the regulations under § 527.
The
communications described in the specific examples are carefully
drafted to be clearly “allowable under the Federal Election
206
Campaign Act.”
That is, the examples that refer to federal
candidates are crafted to describe communications that any
corporation, including 501(c) nonprofit corporations, may legally
pay for with general treasury funds consistent with federal
campaign finance laws. The ruling unambiguously holds that
expenditures for these communications trigger application of the
207
527(f) tax.
Questions still remain about “similar state statutes,”
but there is now precedential authority to indicate that “allowable
under FECA” cannot be read to include any expenditure
permissible under federal election law.
Revenue Ruling 2004-6 is a laudable attempt to provide
meaningful guidance to politically active exempt organizations and
their advisors. By taking on examples that mix “good” and “bad”
facts, it demonstrates how real-world situations might be resolved.
However, it also demonstrates the breadth of the IRS’s
interpretation of the 527 exempt function. Together with the
remaining uncertainties of the “facts and circumstances” approach,
this broad sweep makes this standard ill-suited for importation into
the campaign finance world, an area of law that is designed to
208
address different governmental interests.
B. Gift Tax
Recent popularity in the use of 527 organizations has also been
driven by the fact that contributions to most 501(c) organizations
209
but
(other than 501(c)(3)s) are subject to the gift tax

205. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
206. Treas. Reg. § 1.527-6(b)(3) (1980).
207. Rev. Rul. 2004-6, 2004-4 I.R.B. 328.
208. See infra Part VII (discussing different constitutional analyses of speech
regulation under tax and election law).
209. I.R.C. § 2522.
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210

contributions to 527s are not.
Individual donors are generally
subject to a tax on gratuitous transfers of funds in excess of an
211
annual exclusion.
(This annual exclusion is indexed and was
212
recently raised from $10,000 per year to $11,000.) Gifts in excess
of that amount will either be taxed or consume a portion of the
213
individual’s lifetime exclusion from gift and estate tax.
Gifts to certain organizations are exempt from the gift tax.
Gifts to 527 organizations are exempt from the tax, as are gifts to
214
501(c)(3)s.
Revenue Ruling 82-216 states that “gratuitous
transfers to persons other than organizations described in § 527(e)
of the Code are subject to the gift tax absent any specific statute to
the contrary, even though the transfers may be motivated by a
desire to advance the donor’s own social, political, or charitable
215
There is no such exemption for 501(c)s other than
goals.”
501(c)(3)s.
The incentive created seems to have been inadvertent. It is
not at all clear why Congress chose to exempt 527s and 501(c)(3)s
but not other 501(c) organizations. Indeed, such an outcome is
particularly absurd when applied to 501(c)(4) organizations, many
of which engage solely in activities that, if separated out, could be
conducted independently by 501(c)(3)s and 527s. There is no
apparent rationale for taxing gifts to the 501(c)(4) but exempting
from tax contributions to other organizations carrying out the same
functions. Nonetheless, large donors are understandably reluctant
to subject themselves to possible tax liability by making a
contribution to a 501(c) when an alternative exists in the form of a
contribution to a 527 (for political activities) or a 501(c)(3) (for
non-political activities—with the added bonus, in the case of a
216
501(c)(3) contribution, of a charitable tax deduction).
210. See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(5) (noting exemption from gift tax for § 527
organizations).
211. I.R.C. §§ 2501–05.
212. Id. § 2503(b)(2).
213. This lifetime exclusion is currently $1,500,000. I.R.C. § 2010(c). Absent
any additional action from Congress, the repeal of the estate tax (to which the gift
tax is linked) in 2010 will briefly change this exclusion, but the $1,000,000 gift and
estate tax exclusion will return in 2011 when the estate tax repeal expires. I.R.C. §
2210. (A full discussion of the ups and downs of the estate tax and the political
wrangling it has engendered is, mercifully, beyond the scope of this article.)
214. I.R.C. §§ 2501(a)(5), 2522.
215. Rev. Rul. 82-216, 1982-2 C.B. 220.
216. For a comprehensive and thoughtful discussion of the applicability of the
gift tax to 501(c) organizations, including an ingenious argument against
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C. Primary Purpose Test
The discussion above makes it unnecessary to belabor the
point here, but it is also important to remember that the primary
purpose tests discussed above in the context of 501(c)(4) and 527
organizations also drive the choice of organization used for
political advocacy.
As noted above, 501(c)(4)s and other organizations exempt
from federal tax under § 501(c) of the I.R.C. (except for
501(c)(3)s) may engage in efforts to influence elections as long as
such activities do not become the “primary purpose” of the
217
organization. 501(c) organizations (or their donors) that wish to
engage in additional partisan election-related activity without a
concomitant expansion of the non-partisan aspects of the
organization’s program often look to create 527 organizations,
typically separate segregated funds of the parent organization.
D. Legitimacy of These Strategic Choices
It is worth noting in discussing the strategic reasons pushing
political activities into the much-maligned 527 organizations that
none of the three key reasons discussed above for the growth of
527s as a political tool are anything other than a rational choice to
achieve legitimate goals without wasted resources. Donors wishing
to engage in political activity need not fritter away their funds on
527(f) tax, gift tax, or funds spent inflating the non-political work
of 501(c) organizations. Indeed, since the year 2000, they have
been willing to subject themselves to increased disclosure
218
requirements to make those contributions.
Furthermore, the use of 527s for political activities was
foreseen and acceded to by Congress. Congress passed the
disclosure law just cited in the wake of the presidential primaries of
2000 and several highly publicized cases of 527 intervention in
219
campaigns. Yet Congress chose to require disclosure rather than
application of the gift tax to 501(c)s, see Barbara K. Rhomberg, The Law Remains
Unsettled on Gift Taxation of Section 501(c)(4) Contributions, 15 TAXATION OF EXEMPTS
62 (2003).
217. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
218. See I.R.C. § 527(j) (requiring disclosure of all donors to 527 organizations
not already required to report donors to federal or state election authorities). No
equivalent disclosure requirements exist for donors to 501(c) organizations
engaged in political activities.
219. See e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, The 2000 Campaign: The Tactics; Wealthy
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220

attempt to rein in 527s.
In short, despite much of the recent discourse portraying the
use of 527 organizations as an attempt to circumvent legal
restrictions, these organizations are anticipated and even
encouraged by provisions of the tax code; they are not “loopholes”
or abuses of the system.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
In light of the foregoing, can the standards of federal tax law
constitutionally be applied in attempting to restrict or regulate the
political activities of tax-exempt organizations? We suggest that the
answer is no. The vague definitions and tests that restrict the
political activities of tax-exempt organizations are problematic even
in the context of the government recognition of tax-exempt status.
They are fatally flawed when viewed under the strict constitutional
scrutiny that applies to federal election law.
A. Standards of Review
Government restrictions on speech, particularly core political
speech, face a far more stringent constitutional standard than the
standard that applies to restrictions on political activities of taxexempt organizations.
The courts often have been reluctant to approve restrictions
on core political speech under federal election law. In general, any
such government restrictions must survive strict scrutiny by the
courts, i.e. they must be necessary to achieve a compelling
governmental interest.
In Federal Election Commission v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. the Supreme Court held that a
tax-exempt organization was exempt from the FECA restrictions on
express advocacy communications because “government must
curtail speech only to the degree necessary to meet the particular
problem at hand, and must avoid infringing on speech that does
221
not pose the danger that has prompted regulation.”
The Court
Texan Says He Bought Anti-McCain Ads, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 2000, at A1 (describing
the funding provided by Texas businessman Sam Wyly to the 527 organization
Republicans for Clean Air that was used to fund independent ads bought to
support the presidential campaign of George W. Bush).
220. Indeed, Congress had another opportunity when it amended the
disclosure law in 2002 following the passage of BCRA. See supra note 1. Again
Congress chose the route of disclosure, not regulation.
221. 479 U.S. 238, 265 (1986).
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has been similarly protective of political speech on numerous
occasions. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court reminded us that
“[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates are integral to the operation of the system of
government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment
affords the broadest protection to such political expression in
order ‘to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
222
people.’”
The Buckley Court went on to cite other cases in which
the Supreme Court viewed restrictions on political speech with a
223
skeptical eye.
Buckley was the Supreme Court case from 1976 that struck
down much of the original FECA as an unconstitutional regulation
of protected political speech. The Buckley Court upheld the
portion of the law restricting the use of corporate or union funds
for certain activities only by narrowly interpreting the law to restrict
what became known as “express advocacy” communications—
communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
224
clearly identified federal candidate. Over the years of post-Buckley
litigation, many courts have limited the scope of “express advocacy”
to communications that clearly identify a federal candidate and use
the so-called “magic words” in reference to that candidate—“vote
for,” “vote against,” “support,” “oppose,” “elect,” “defeat,” “re-elect,”
225
etc.
Because Congress failed to set any other standard that the
Court might have approved, the express advocacy “magic words”

222. 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957)).
223. Id. at 14–15. “[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs . . . of course includ[ing] discussions of candidates . . . .” Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). “[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
“[I]t can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and
most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.”
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
224. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.
225. Id. See also, e.g., Maine Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 810 (1997); Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 F.3d 1049, 1055 (4th Cir. 1997);
Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir. 1999);
Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d
1174, 1187 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding for narrow definition of ‘express advocacy’);
but see Fed. Election Comm’n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 850 (1987) (upholding broader interpretation of “express advocacy”).
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test became the gauge against which all corporate or union
political communications were measured.
In contrast, tax-exempt organizations voluntarily assume
restrictions far more onerous than those that the government may
generally impose because the organizations accept these
restrictions in exchange for the grant of certain tax benefits. As a
key case upholding the restriction on political activities by
501(c)(3)s explains:
In light of the fact that tax exemption is a privilege, a
matter of grace rather than right, we hold that the
limitations contained in section 501(c)(3) withholding
exemption from nonprofit corporations do not deprive
[the organization] of its constitutionally guaranteed right
of free speech. The taxpayer may engage in all such
activities without restraint, subject, however, to
withholding of the exemption or, in the alternative, the
taxpayer may refrain from such activities and obtain the
226
privilege of exemption.
Even in the context of tax exemption, there are limits on the
ability of the government to impose restrictions on constitutionally
227
protected activities as a condition of a grant of tax benefits.
In
particular, organizations that do not receive the much-favored
501(c)(3) status, with the accompanying ability to accept taxdeductible contributions, do not enjoy the same level of tax subsidy
(if any). It seems reasonable that courts would be willing to
countenance fewer restrictions imposed in return for this less
favorable treatment. Nonetheless, the courts generally have been
willing to allow at least some substantial limits on the otherwise
228
protected activities of tax-exempt organizations.
B. Restrictions on Political Speech Under Tax Law
As the discussion above makes clear, there is a great deal of
uncertainty in existing law about definition of political activity for
226. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. U.S., 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir.
1972).
227. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (overturning a law
requiring anyone seeking a property tax exemption to declare that he or she did
not advocate the forcible overthrow of the Government of the United States).
228. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S.
540 (1983) (upholding restrictions on lobbying by 501(c)(3) organizations).
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tax-exempt organizations. Even if one theoretically determines
that there is, in fact, a single line defining 501(c)(3) campaign
intervention, 501(c)(4) political activity, and 527 exempt function,
it must be acknowledged that this line has not been drawn with any
precision. The “facts and circumstances” approach may have the
benefit of allowing a decision-maker to reach what he or she
perceives as the “right” outcome in every case. However, a test that
puts this much discretion in the hands of the tax administrator
could suffer from constitutional weaknesses. It certainly provides
no assurance to an organization that it will not be subject to tax, or
even loss of its tax-exempt status, on the basis of activities that are
plainly legal under applicable election law and in fact constitute
protected political speech under the First Amendment.
This vagueness is manifest in the definition of 527 exempt
229
function as explored in the letter rulings in the late 1990s.
How
an activity will be treated for tax purposes depends on evidence of
the organization’s subjective intent. It appears possible that the
exact same activity might be characterized as permissible 501(c)(3)
activity or 527 exempt function based solely on evidence of the
230
organization’s intent.
231
Congress need not subsidize protected political speech.
However, constitutional principles require that citizens be given
reasonable notice of proscribed conduct. A law will be struck if
“men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
232
meaning.” Laws are also invalidated if they are “wholly lacking in
233
The void-for‘terms susceptible of objective measurement.’”
vagueness doctrine further requires explicit standards for
government officials, who might otherwise engage in arbitrary and
234
discriminatory enforcement.
229. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051 (Mar. 29, 1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-08-037 (Nov.
21, 1997).
230. This is contrary to repeated IRS statements that subjective intent is
irrelevant to identifying campaign intervention. For a more nuanced discussion of
the appropriate consideration of intent or state of mind in examining 501(c)(3)
activities, see 2002 ELECTION YEAR ISSUES CPE, supra note 37, at 350–52.
231. See Regan, 461 U.S. 540.
232. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976) (quoting Connally v.
Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
77 (1976).
233. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (quoting Cramp v.
Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 286 (1961)).
234. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 nn.3–4 (1972). This
appears to be the position taken by the plaintiff in litigation currently pending in
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The standard the IRS has set for 501(c)(4)s fails these tests.
The regulations define social welfare activities as excluding “direct
or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on
235
behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office.” On
its face this standard appears to lack terminology that is susceptible
of objective assessment. Given the dearth of precedential guidance
on the subject, it is arguably so vague as to what speech is
encompassed within its ambit that ordinary people cannot know
whether their organization is exempt under § 501(c)(4) and hence
what requirements the tax law imposes on it. Further, the
imprecision of the “facts and circumstances” approach, together
with the vagueness of the campaign intervention standard, enable
arbitrary administration of these laws.
This constitutional difficulty cannot be addressed by
suggesting an organization could avoid legal difficulties by avoiding
all political activity. Even for tax-exempt organizations, this is core
political speech protected under the First Amendment. Adopting
taxable status may also not be an option, because an organization
whose primary activities are political may be forced into 527 status.
Field Service Advice 2000-37-040 indicates that an organization that
fails to be a 501(c)(4) because it primarily engages in political
activity will be treated as a 527, and that 527 is not an elective
236
provision. There is no safe area of operations for an organization
uncertain how its activities will be classed by the IRS. It must
apparently be either a 501(c)(4) or a 527, but lacks sufficient
guidance to determine in close cases which is the correct
District Court. See Complaint at ¶¶ 46–54, The Christian Coalition Int’l v. U.S.,
No. 2:01CV377 (E.D. Va.), available in 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 165-27. The case
appears to have stalled, but the authors have hopes that it will at some point
proceed and shed further light on the questions discussed herein. See also ABA
Members Comment on Exempt Organizations and Politics, 45 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 136,
161 n.73 (2004).
235. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990).
236. A recent circuit court decision appears to be to the contrary, upholding
the registration and disclosure provisions of § 527 based in part on the idea that
exemption under § 527 is optional. Nat’l Fed’n of Republican Assemblies v.
United States, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (S.D. Ala. 2002) vacated by Mobile Republican
Assembly v. U.S., 353 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2003). However IRS officials have
stated that the Service reads this case to hold that registration is optional but 527
status is not. Edited Transcript of the January 30, 2004 ABA Tax Section EO Committee
Meeting, 44 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 23, 29 (2004) ("Whether or not you choose to
register and therefore avail yourself of the tax-exempt status that 527 makes
available is voluntary. . . . But we do not understand the statute to say that whether
or not you're a political organization is a voluntary matter.").
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conclusion. The organization that guesses wrong stands not only to
lose its 501(c)(4) status but also to face severe penalties for failure
to comply with the registration and disclosure requirements of §
527. Unlike the case of 501(c)(3)s, political activity does not just
delimit the end of a tax subsidy. Which side of the 501(c)(4)/527
line an organization falls on determines significant legal
237
obligations.
For nonprofits to have a reasonable chance of
complying, they must have clear rules.
Thus, there is a plausible argument that the Constitution
demands that an objectively determinable line be drawn defining
the scope of political activity that will cause a 501(c)(4) to lose its
exemption if it is the organization’s primary activity. (Similar
arguments apply to activity that will trigger the 527(f) tax, but that
is not the topic of discussion here.) If the question is not resolved
legislatively or administratively it may be that the courts will be left
to decide.
C. Restrictions on Political Speech Under Election Law
If these rules are problematic when applied as a condition to
recognition of tax exemption, the recent attempts by certain
campaign reform proponents and members of the FEC to import
them into federal election law is of even greater concern. The
vague standards of the tax code are fundamentally unsuitable for
use as a general standard for regulating electoral speech.
1.

The Political Committee Rulemaking

As the country faced its first post-BCRA election, many
interests were attempting to take the new landscape of federal
election law into account. The stakes were—and, as we write this,
still are—high. The 2000 presidential election was the closest in
this country’s history. The deep partisan divisions left by decades
of often vicious inter-party warfare were worsened by the aftermath
of the November 2000 elections and fundamental policy
disagreements between the parties about critically important issues.
Political ideologues scrambled to find any advantage they could in
the new, untested federal election laws. Those who had succeeded
237. These legal obligations include the requirement that § 527 organizations
register within twenty-four hours of establishment and file monthly or quarterly
reports with the IRS that include donor and expenditure information. See I.R.C.
§§ 527(i),(j),(k).
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in passing BCRA were committed to making sure that they would
keep their hard-won victory, and perhaps even extend it.
Certain political operatives, primarily, but not exclusively, on
the left, believed that it was necessary to create new, independent
entities to support the soft-money operations—particularly basemobilizing voter registration and GOTV efforts, but also issue
advertising—that the parties were less able to fund in the wake of
BCRA’s soft-money ban. Often (but not always) these new entities
238
were established as non-party 527 organizations to permit large
donors to make unlimited contributions free from fear of the gift
tax. The creation of these new 527 organizations, and the gifts
made to them by several large donors, were prominently reported
in the media, often with the assistance of the organizations and
239
donors themselves.
While not intended as such, these new organizations were a
finger in the eye of those in the campaign reform community who
believed that the intent of BCRA was to eliminate the use of
240
unlimited funds to influence elections.
Several of these reform
organizations sought theoretical constructs to regulate the newly
emerged 527s.
These reform groups found allies in the Republican National
Committee and right-leaning advocacy organizations. Republicans
had been slower to embrace the post-BCRA 527 strategy. The
reason for this may have been a belief that Republicans’ longstanding advantage over the Democrats in attracting ‘hard’ political
contributions to candidates and parties would be multiplied by the
increases in hard money limits under BCRA, making Republicanleaning 527s unnecessary. Republican control of the White House
and both houses of Congress likely gave the party further reason to
believe that its hard money fundraising would be successful. It may
have been that Republicans expected to instead rely on support
from Republican-leaning 501(c)(6) trade associations. Whatever
the reasons for the apparent Republican reluctance to embrace the
use of 527 organizations, the party was certainly eager to see
238. As discussed, supra Part II.A, the authors are using the popular, and
inaccurate, term ‘527 organization’ to refer to independent entities organized
under § 527 of the Internal Revenue Code that are not currently required to
register as political committees under FECA.
239. See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Liberals Form Fund To Defeat President; Aim Is to
Spend $75 Million for 2004, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2003, at A3; Glen Justice, George
Soros Gives, and Republicans React with Fury, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, at A2.
240. See discussion of BCRA’s purposes, supra note 4.
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Democrats, as the primary proponents of campaign finance reform,
feel a bit of pain related to the new law. Thus, the high-profile
early success of Democratic-leaning 527s helped to forge a new
alliance of convenience between the anti-527 campaign reform
groups, the Republican National Committee, and other Republican
or right-leaning groups.
These strange bedfellows, the reform community and the
Republicans, looked to BCRA and the ruling upholding it in
McConnell v. FEC to find a broader alternative to Buckley’s narrow
“express advocacy” test. In McConnell, the Court had reminded us
that “express advocacy” was only one possible way to define the
scope of political speech that could be regulated by government
241
without violating the First Amendment.
The Court upheld
another when it approved BCRA’s provisions related to
242
electioneering communications.
In addition, the Court upheld
BCRA’s ban on the raising and use of soft-money by state parties to
fund “federal election activities,” defined as including “any public
communication” that “refers to a clearly identified [federal]
candidate” and “promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes” such a
243
The anti-527 coalition believed that if the Supreme
candidate.
Court had upheld this broad test as constitutional in the context of
soft-money restrictions on parties, then it would also pass
constitutional muster in the context of a restriction on
independent groups.
The reform coalition’s hopes for a broader standard with
241. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 124 S.Ct. 619 (2003). This
ruling breaks no new ground in this regard. Buckley already made it clear that the
express advocacy standard was merely the Supreme Court’s best line-drawing
effort when presented with the vague and overbroad language of the original
FECA. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1976). The real issue—in 1976, in
2003, and still today—is who may engage in that line-drawing—only Congress and
the Supreme Court, or the FEC as well?
242. See McConnell, 124 S.Ct. 619 (ruling that definition of electioneering
communications in BCRA lacked the problems of vagueness and overbreadth that
led the Court to apply the express advocacy standard in Buckley).
243. Id. at 675 (upholding restrictions on party communications within 120
days of an election that promote, support, attack, or oppose a candidate as “closely
drawn to the anticorruption interest it is intended to address”). The Court
suggested that the “promote, support, attack, or oppose” standard was easy to
apply and gave it only limited discussion when approving it in the context of
communications by political parties, which might be presumed to be engaged in
activities designed to get their candidates elected. Id. at 675 n.64. We suggest
that the standard is far more difficult to apply and would be subject to a more
extensive and probing Supreme Court review if it were applied, instead, in the
context of independent organizations.
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which to regulate 527s relied on language from Buckley that
suggests that, while an “express advocacy” or other bright-line
standard was generally necessary to preserve the constitutionality of
attempts to restrict independent election-related speech, groups
that primarily existed to support or oppose federal candidates
244
could be more broadly regulated.
The would-be reformers
reasoned that because under federal tax law a 527 organization was
operated primarily for the purpose of engaging in “political”
exempt functions under 527(e), then these organizations were
among those that the Supreme Court had suggested could be more
broadly regulated.
Effective advocacy from this coalition and, more to the point,
its supporters on the FEC, led to an attempt in the spring of 2004
to put this theory into regulation. The FEC’s notice of proposed
rulemaking on Political Committee Status (NPRM 2004-6)
proposed that an organization that in any year spends certain
threshold amounts on so-called “federal election activities” would
be a federal political committee and thus be subject to strict
245
fundraising limitations under FECA.
These “federal election
activities” included nonpartisan voter registration and GOTV
efforts, and any activity that “promotes, supports, attacks, or
246
opposes” a candidate for federal office.
In these situations, 527

244. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79–82 (upholding against vagueness challenge
restrictions on “organizations that are under the control of a candidate or the
major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate”). However
the Court explicitly references in this discussion its early holding overturning
similar restrictions on independent organizations, and the Court only applied this
definition in the context of express advocacy communications by those
committees. Id. It seems unlikely that the Court intended this language to be the
basis of broader restrictions of groups not controlled by candidates and not
engaged in express advocacy.
245. See 69 Fed. Reg. 11,736 (Mar. 11, 2004) (proposing definitions of
“political committee”); 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(C), 441b, 441c (West 2004)
(limiting individual contributions to a maximum of $5,000 per year and
forbidding contributions to political committees by corporations, union, foreign
nationals, and government contractors). This summary of some of the key points
of the proposal utterly fails to convey the vast scope of this rulemaking. Many of
the complaints from commentators on all sides of the debate criticized the scope
of the proposed regulations and the difficulty in responding coherently. See, e.g.,
Comments of Democracy 21, the Campaign Legal Center, and the Center for
Responsive Politics, supra note 6. The problem was particularly acute given that
the FEC was pursuing an accelerated schedule, with the hope of finalizing
regulations in time for the 2004 elections.
246. 69 Fed. Reg 11,736 (Mar. 11, 2004) (citing 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.24(b)(1)(3)).
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organizations would automatically be treated as federal political
247
committees.
In short, the NPRM sought to couple a new test for political
activity—“promote, support, attack, or oppose”—with the IRS
definition of 527 status. That status would be sufficient to force an
organization to become a “political committee” under FECA and
248
trigger application of this ill-defined standard.
The proposal generated a traffic jam of nearly 200,000
comments, which was more than the FEC had ever received on a
249
single proposal.
A huge number of comments came from taxexempt organizations that (correctly) feared that adopting the
proposed rules as written would effectively curtail their legitimate
election-related activities.
In April, the Commission voted to delay the rulemaking for
ninety days to study the matter further, effectively ending any
chance that new rules would be in effect in time for the 2004
250
federal elections.
In August, the FEC’s General Counsel
produced a new proposed final rule that likewise would have
251
regulated many 527s as political committees.
Although still
252
flawed in the eyes of the authors, the new draft was responsive to
the concerns expressed in many comments the FEC received in
response to the earlier NPRM. In particular, the new proposal did
253
not sweep all 527s into the FEC’s regulatory net.
However, the
247. Id. at Alternative 2-A and 2-B.
248. In practice, the “promote, support, attack, or oppose” standard may not
be as clear as the McConnell Court seemed to suggest, at least outside the context
of political parties. During the FEC’s meeting to consider Advisory Opinion 200337, the Commissioners engaged in an extended debate from the dais about
whether or not a particular communication “attacked or opposed.” Audio tape:
Fed. Election Comm’n Open Meeting (Feb. 18, 2004) (on file with authors and
available from the FEC).
249. Lisa Getter, The Race to the White House; Hearings Open on Spending by
Advocate Groups; Some members of election panel call the timetable on proposed new rules
unworkable, L.A. TIMES, April 15, 2004, at A24.
250. See Minutes of an Open Meeting of the Federal Election Commission May
13, 2004 (Agenda Document 04-51, Approved June 10, 2004).
251. Draft Final Rules for Political Committee Status (Agenda Document No.
04-75 for FEC Open Meeting Agenda for Aug. 19, 2004), http://www.fec.gov
/agenda/mtgdoc04-75.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2004).
252. See Letter of August 17, 2004, from Harmon, Curran, Spielberg &
Eisenberg to FEC, http://www.harmoncurran.com/HCSE%20PolComLtr.pdf
(last visited Oct. 3, 2004) (criticizing certain flaws in the draft and requesting that
the FEC seek further public comment before proceeding with the rulemaking to
define “political committee”).
253. See Draft Final Rules for Political Committee Status, supra note 252, at
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254

proposal failed to muster the four votes necessary for adoption.
Instead the FEC passed only the portion of the proposal related to
the rules for allocating disbursements between federal and nonfederal political committee accounts, and the portion expanding
the definition of “contribution” to include funds received in
255
response to certain fundraising solicitations.
Campaign reformers have expressed their anger at what they
see as the latest FEC derogation of its duty and have threatened to
pursue regulation of 527s through possible congressional action or
256
litigation.
2.

Vagueness

It is unnecessary to restate the detailed criticism of the
vagueness of the tax standards for defining political activity. As
should be clear from the discussion above, the apparent simplicity
of the tax law’s definition of political activity and the seeming
consistency of the regulatory scheme encompassing different types
of tax-exempt organizations masks the fundamental problem with
the system: its inherent vagueness and subjectivity. These problems
are insurmountable in the context of the constitutional review that
federal election laws face.
FECA regulates core political speech and imposes criminal
penalties for violations. Thus, FECA is especially intolerant of
vague standards. As the Court explained in Buckley:
Due process requires that a criminal statute provide
adequate notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that
his contemplated conduct is illegal, for ‘no man shall be
held criminally responsible for conduct which he could
not reasonably understand to be proscribed.’ Where First
Amendment rights are involved, an even ‘greater degree
257
of specificity’ is required.
Given the strict scrutiny with which the courts would view any
proposed § 100.5 (proposed regulations that would treat some, but not all, 527
organizations and other organizations as federal political committees).
254. Kenneth P. Doyle, FEC Votes 4-2 to Adopt Limited New Rule Requiring “Hard
Money” for Some 527 Groups, BNA MONEY & POLITICS REPORTER, Aug. 20, 2004.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976) (citing U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S.
612, 617 (1954) and Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974)).
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general restriction on political activity, no court could possibly find
that the IRS definition of political exempt-function activities for
527 organizations would provide the necessary “adequate notice” to
survive a constitutional challenge for vagueness.
3.

Overbreadth

To survive Supreme Court review, any law regulating federal
electoral activities must be necessary to achieve a compelling
governmental purpose. The Supreme Court has been willing to
find the compelling purpose in the need to protect the democratic
258
process from the threat of corruption. However, in attempting to
import the tax-law definitions of political activity, the reformers
have attempted to restrict activities far in excess of those necessary
to achieve that goal.
An effort to bring all 527 organizations under FECA’s
restrictions on political committees, as was suggested in the most
recent political committee rulemaking and by some submitting
comments, would regulate a wide range of activities protected
259
under the First Amendment.
The IRS has long recognized that
its standards for identifying political activity by tax-exempt
organizations capture far more activity than is regulated under
260
federal election law.
As discussed above, many examples exist of
legitimate activities that would be swept into the regulatory net of
the FEC if all 527s are treated as political committees under federal
election law.
At the outset, it should be obvious that any federal attempt to
regulate all 527 organizations would be excessive. Many
organizations that qualify for tax exemption under I.R.C. § 527 are
not primarily engaged in influencing federal elections. These 527
organizations operate, in whole or in part, to influence state or
258. Id.
259. See NPRM 2004-6, supra note †, at 11,741; Letter from Democracy 21 et al.,
to FEC, supra note 6.
260. The IRS has recognized that its congressionally granted authority to
restrict political activities of tax-exempt organizations is appreciably greater than
the Commission’s authority to regulate political speech more generally. In its
training manual for IRS examiners and other staff, the IRS states, “[t]he language
of IRC 501(c)(3) indicates a much broader scope to the concept of participation
or intervention in a political campaign.” See Memorandum for Churches on Election
"Voter Guides," 30 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 193, 196 (2000) (contrasting the ruling of
the court in Federal Election Commission v. Christian Coalition, Inc., 52 F. Supp.
2d 45 (D.D.C. 1999), in which the court held that a narrow definition of political
activity was constitutionally necessary under federal election law).
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local elections or to influence nominations for appointed offices
261
such as judicial nominations.
Even in the context of races for federal elective office, there
are numerous activities that the tax code recognizes as 527 exempt
function activities—activities that could lead the IRS to classify an
organization as a 527—that are beyond the constitutional reach of
FECA. Some 527s engage in activities related to federal election
activities that fall within this gap, making per se treatment of them as
federal political committees inappropriate. Drawn from the rulings
discussed above, each of the following examples describes an
organization that the IRS would consider to be a 527 organization
subject to FECA restrictions regulating all 527s organizations as a
class:
•

The sole activity of a 527 organization created to
“elevat[e] the standards of ethics and morality . . . in
the conduct of campaigns for [political office]” is
seeking candidate commitment to the organization’s
“code of fair campaign practices.” The organization
produces materials that list the names of candidates
who support the code. The IRS has ruled that an
organization that approaches all candidates for office
and asks that they sign or endorse such a code has
engaged in an activity that “constitutes participation or
262
intervention in a political campaign.” Under current

261. The 2004-6 NPRM’s Alternative 2-B would have regulated all 527s, but
Alternative 2-A would have exempted 527s that engage in some of these purposes
other than influencing races for federal elective office. Yet even Alternative 2-A
would only have exempted 527s engaged “solely” in these non-federal activities. It
is possible that a 527 organization might engage in some federal election activities
but be primarily engaged in efforts to influence state and local elections. For
example, a 527 organization might dedicate twenty percent of its efforts and
resources to federal election activities with the remainder going to non-federal
‘exempt function’ activities. Yet under Alternative 2-A, the slightest taint of activity
related to federal elections would have forced the 527 organization to operate
under the restrictive rules governing federal political committees. 2004-6 NPRM,
supra note †. Finally, as noted above, the most recent draft rules from the FEC’s
General Counsel would not have regulated all 527 organizations, but even this
draft would have applied more stringent standards to 527s than to other types of
tax-exempt organizations. See Draft Final Rules for Political Committee Status,
supra note 252, at proposed sections 100.5(a)(3)–(6) (setting forth proposed rules
making it more likely that certain 527 organizations would be treated as political
committees).
262. Rev. Rul. 76-456, 1976-2 C.B. 151 (modifying Rev. Rul. 66-258, 1966-2 C.B.
213).
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federal election law, this activity would not be an
“expenditure”; it would not require federal “hard
263
money.”
Yet a 527 organization engaged solely in
this activity would be treated as a federal political
committee if the FEC were to import the tax law
definition into election law.
•

The sole activity of a 527 organization is to publish
advertisements to promote a particular state ballot
measure. None of these advertisements refer to a
candidate for elective office, but the organization has
evidence that the effort will likely bring out voters who
tend to support a federal candidate running for
reelection on the same ballot. The IRS has ruled that
this organization would qualify as a 527 organization
264
and would not qualify as a 501(c) organization.
Under current federal election law, this activity would
not be an “expenditure”; it would not require federal
“hard money.” Yet a 527 organization engaged solely
in this activity would be treated as a federal political
committee if the FEC were to import the tax law
definition into election law.

•

The sole activity of a 527 organization devoted to
improving the quality of elected officials is rating the
qualifications of all candidates for Congress and
publishing the results prior to an election. The ratings
are not based on political ideology but rather on
nonpartisan criteria including the candidates’ prior
governmental experience, a survey that asks public
officials (such as state legislators, governors, mayors,
and other members of Congress) and members of the
press to identify those candidates who are “effective,”
and an evaluation of the candidates’ responsiveness to
constituent requests for assistance. In many cases, the

263. See 11 C.F.R. 114.4(c)(5)(i) (2004). (For purposes of this and all
subsequent examples, we assume that there is no issue of coordination with
candidates.)
264. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-25-051 (Mar. 29, 1999) (effort to support ballot
measure is ‘exempt function’ activity if organization has evidence to show that
work would support or oppose a candidate for elective office).
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ratings do not indicate the preferred candidate in a
particular race because all candidates for that race
share the same rating. Faced with a tax-exempt
organization that conducted a similar nonpartisan
rating project for state judicial candidates, the IRS
ruled that the organization had intervened in an
election, and the court considering an appeal from the
IRS decision stated that although this activity was
nonpartisan and in the public interest, it nevertheless
constituted participation or intervention in a political
265
campaign.
Under current federal election law, this
activity would not be an “expenditure”; it would not
require federal “hard money.” Yet a 527 organization
engaged solely in this activity would be treated as a
federal political committee if the FEC were to import
the tax law definition into election law.
•

The sole activity of a 527 organization is publishing a
voter guide for its members and others concerned with
environmental issues. The guide compiles incumbents’
voting records on selected environmental legislation of
importance to the organization and provides a factual,
objective summary of the policy issues that underlie
each bill. The guide contains no express statements in
support of or in opposition to any candidate. The
guide is widely distributed among the electorate during
an election campaign. In analyzing a similar example
as a 501(c)(3) activity, the IRS stated, “while the guide
may provide the voting public with useful information,
its emphasis on one area of concern indicates that its
266
purpose is not nonpartisan voter education.”
In a
later Private Letter Ruling, the IRS confirmed this
analysis, suggesting that a voting record distributed
during the election season and focusing on selected

265. Ass’n of the Bar of New York v. Comm’r, 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989).
266. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154. As discussed above, several IRS rulings
suggest that failure to cover a broad range of issues in a voter guide, id., a
legislative scorecard, id., or a candidate debate, Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73, will
cause the IRS to treat the activity as political. As a result any organization that
focuses on a single issue and that wishes to engage in one of these activities as the
organization’s primary purpose, must be organized as a 527 organization.
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issues of importance to the organization would be an
267
“exempt function” activity under § 527 of the I.R.C.
Under current federal election law, this activity would
not be an “expenditure”; it would not require federal
“hard money.” Yet a 527 organization engaged solely
in this activity would be treated as a federal political
committee if the FEC were to import the tax law
definition into election law.
It is hard to imagine Supreme Court approval of a wholesale
adoption of the IRS definitions of political activity when they could
lead to criminal penalties under federal election law for
organizations engaged in activities such as these.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the months preceding the 2004 presidential elections, it was
a beautiful time for a drive. Campaign reform proponents had
gotten a brand new car from Congress, and the Supreme Court
had just finished gassing it up for them.
It is perhaps
understandable that their collective foot may have been a little
heavy on the accelerator as they headed down the highway.
At the same time, the FEC decided to take a short cut through
the intersection of tax and election law. Unfortunately, the
recently proposed rules skidded on the tax law’s slippery pavement
and plowed headlong into the Constitution. The regulatory vehicle
is going to be in the shop until at least after the November
elections. We hope that when it returns to the road, it will follow a
wiser route to reform.
Although we cannot provide a
comprehensive roadmap to that destination, we hope that this
article has at least pointed out some potholes along the route.

267.

Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-08-037 (Nov. 21, 1997).
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